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INTRODUCTION
While sub-Saharan Africa1 was hit hard by the global recession of
2008-09, the region’s economies seem to be more resilient than the
economies of much of the world.2 However, as Africa emerges from
the downturn, the quality and character of its emergence is not yet
clear. Can the continent’s varied economies resurface stronger than
ever in the same way high-growth developing states outside of Africa
1. Sub-Saharan Africa typically refers to those African countries which are
fully or partially located south of the Sahara Desert, in contrast to the countries that
constitute North Africa. This paper focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, but in the
interest of space will often refer to sub-Saharan Africa by the term “Africa” alone.
2. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: APRIL 2010:
REBALANCING GROWTH 2 (2010), available at http://www.imf.org/external/
pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/pdf/text.pdf (showing a downturn in growth for sub-Saharan
Africa from 5.5% for 2008 to 2.1% growth for 2009, but projecting increased
growth rates of 4.7% for 2010 and 5.9% for 2011; whereas world growth is shown
as 1.8% for 2008, -2.1% for 2009, 3.2% for 2010, and 3.4% for 2011).
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are poised to rebound?
Despite the plethora of challenges facing African states today, the
nature of the continent’s recovery, as well as the future of its
economic and political development, will likely hinge on progress
made in the battle against official corruption.3 This paper argues that
Africa’s future depends on a reduction in corruption and proposes
essential changes to the current battle against corruption in order to
ensure that it is fought thoroughly and effectively.
Part I discusses the opportunities and risks investors and
companies face in Africa, highlighting the potential perils of the
continent’s focus on natural resource exportation, and explains the
importance of an established rule of law, unfettered by corruption, as
necessary to sustain economic growth and development. Part II
addresses the primary supply-side anti-corruption tool in use today,
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), and highlights the
mounting yet uneven enforcement of the law in Africa. Part III
presents a case study of China’s activities in Africa, illustrating how
irregular enforcement of anti-corruption regulations combined with
foreign engagement lacking sensitivity to the fragility of the rule of
law, particularly in poorly-governed African states, can exacerbate
corruption and its associated ills. Part IV discusses the lagging
demand-side anti-corruption efforts in Africa. Part VI presents two
potential endgame scenarios in the fight against corruption on the
continent. And finally, Part VII lays out the specific need for
consistent, global supply-side measures, a greater focus on demandside efforts, and sustained commitments by governments around the
world to fight corruption in Africa, even when not politically
expedient.

3. See For African Business, Ending Corruption is ‘Priority Number One’,
AFR. RENEWAL, Aug. 2010, at 7-8, available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/
geninfo/afrec/vol24no2-3/Africa-Renewal-August-2010-en.pdf
(noting
that
business leaders from fifteen African countries all cited corruption as their top
concern because it undermines competition and growth in the market).
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I. POST-RECESSION SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:
OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS
The recession of 2008-09 hit global economies hard and did not
spare the economies of sub-Saharan Africa.4 As the global appetite
for risk evaporated, commodity prices collapsed and investors fled
Africa, a continent still generally considered to be “the riskiest
region.”5 Banks drastically curtailed lending to African exporters at a
higher rate than to exporters in other regions, and the continent’s
export-driven economies suffered from the heightened risk aversion,
lower energy consumption, and lower commodity prices.6 Average
growth rates on the continent dipped from a continuous 4% increase
each year from 2001-057 and 6% increase each year from 2006-08, to
only a 2.5% increase in 2009.8
Nevertheless, compared to the rest of the world, “Africa weathered
the economic storms well.”9 Many sub-Saharan African economies
grew at a rate approximately twice as fast as economies in Europe or
the United States prior to the recession and contracted less sharply
during the recession.10 Average growth on the continent is projected
4. INT’L MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA:
BACK
TO
HIGH
GROWTH?
4
(2010),
available
at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2010/afr/eng/sreo0410.pdf (noting that the
median growth rate in the region’s low-income and fragile “countries decelerated .
. . from 5.5% in 2004-08 to 3.5% in 2009”).
5. Paul Collier, The Case for Investing in Africa, MCKINSEY Q., June 2010, at
2, available at http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/PDFdownload.aspx?ar=2611.
6. See id. at 2 (emphasizing that oil prices dropped more than $100 per
barrel).
7. See AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT & THE WORLD BANK,
AFRICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE: A TIME FOR TRANSFORMATION 2 (Vivien Foster &
Cecilia Briceño-Garmedia eds., 2010), available at http://www.infrastructure
africa.org/aicd/system/files.AIATT_consolidated_smaller.pdf.
8. AEO Finds Africa Hit by the Crisis But Set to Rebound, ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV. (May 24, 2010), http://www.oecd.org/document/33/
0,3343,en_2649_33731_45248993_1_1_1_1,00.html.
9. Collier, supra note 5, at 2.
10. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: APRIL 2007:
SPILLOVERS AND CYCLES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 2 (2007), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/pdf/text.pdf (providing annual
growth rates and growth projections of countries and regions for the years 200508); see also Africa’s GDP Growth Could Reach 7 pct in 2011: AfDB, REUTERS
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://af.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=AFJOE61L14O20100
222 (arguing that “[t]he world’s poorest continent, mainly dependent on minerals
and commodity exports for revenue, surprised economists by weathering the global
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to rise to 5.5% in 2010 and 7% in 2011, outpacing rates in the
developed world.11 Categorized by region, anticipated 2010-11
growth rates range from 4% in Central and South Africa, to 5% in
North and West Africa, to at least 6% in East Africa.12 In the wake of
the global financial crisis and while Western banks still lick the
wounds inflicted by toxic debts, African banks remain “among the
healthier financial companies anywhere in the world.”13 To date,
Africa’s economies rebounded with greater vigor in part because of
the rapid stabilization of commodity prices.14 Of the twenty fastest
growing economies on earth today, eight are in Africa.15

A. OPPORTUNITIES
Sub-Saharan Africa today is a land of both vast opportunity and
significant risk for investors and corporations alike. The economic
rebound in Africa is driven by a high demand for natural resources,
primarily from China and other fast-growing Asian economies,
which shows few signs of slowing.16 Growth of the resource trade is
economic crisis better than the West”).
11. See Africa’s GDP Growth Could Reach 7 pct in 2011: AfDB, supra note 10
(citing GDP predictions from the International Monetary Fund and African
Development Bank); see also AEO Finds Africa Hit by the Crisis But Set to
Rebound, supra note 8 (forecasting that growth will reach 4.5% in 2010 and 5.2%
in 2011); Gus Lubin & Lawrence Delevingne, Corruption In Africa’s ‘Best
Countries’ Can Still Crush Investors, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2010, 8:42AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/corruption-in-africas-best-countries-can-stillcrush-investors-2010-2 (predicting that sub-Saharan Africa’s economies will grow
at a rate of over 1% above the global average in 2010-11).
12. AEO Finds Africa Hit by the Crisis But Set to Rebound, supra note 8
(stating that “the continent has proved resilient to the crisis” due to macroeconomic
policies in force prior to the downturn, sustained aid flows, and assistance from the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the African Development
Bank).
13. Ethan B. Kapstein, Africa’s Capitalist Revolution: Preserving Growth in a
Time of Crisis, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 124 (2009) (noting that African banks were
“relatively shielded from the toxic assets that are now laying waste to U.S. and
European financial institutions”).
14. See Collier, supra note 5, at 2-3 (explaining that prices stabilized,
generally, at levels higher than before the recession).
15. Lubin & Delevingne, supra note 11 (indicating that Angola is predicted to
grow 9% and Republic of Congo 12%).
16. See Charles Roxburgh et al., Asia Should Buy Into Africa’s Growth,
FORBES (Aug. 12, 2010, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/08/12/asiachina-africa-trade-growth-markets-economy-investment.html (noting that Asian
and African economies are increasingly crossing paths and that Asian companies
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predicted to accelerate, given the likelihood that current exploration
has merely scratched the surface of valuable subsoil deposits in the
region.17
In addition, opportunities for foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in
Africa are plentiful, and historical FDI returns on the continent are
high. The rate of return on FDI in Africa averaged 29% from 1990 to
1999,18 and continued to be the highest of any developing region in
the world during 2006-07.19 At the same time, FDI inflows
(particularly outside the petroleum industry) remain relatively low,
and therefore opportunities for investment exist.20 Specifically,
healthy growth and investment opportunities exist in the energy,
banking, telecommunications and technology, materials, and
pharmaceuticals industries.21 As GDP per capita grows in China and
should look to invest more into four African sectors: consumer goods and services,
natural resources, agriculture, and infrastructure); see also Collier, supra note 5, at
3 (remarking that worldwide commodity prices have increased due to emerging
Asian markets).
17. See Collier, supra note 5, at 3 (“In the long-explored countries of the
OECD, the average square kilometer of territory still has beneath it around
$114,000 of known subsoil assets, despite two centuries of intense extraction. In
contrast, the average square kilometer of sub-Saharan Africa has a mere $23,000 of
known subsoil assets . . . . [T]he difference in known assets is likely to indicate an
offsetting difference in what is awaiting discovery.”).
18. Ernest Harsch, Africa’s Untapped Investment Potential, 13 AFR. RECOVERY
ONLINE 26 (1999), http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol13no2/26_
27eca.htm.
19. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2008:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE, at xvii,
U.N. Sales No. E.08.II.D.23 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/
docs/wir2008_en.pdf; see Collier, supra note 5, at 2 (reporting that return on
investment of companies operating in Africa was two-thirds higher than companies
operating in China, India, Indonesia, or Vietnam).
20. Samuel Kamndaya, Africa: Poor Infrastructure Scares Away Investors,
Africa Told, THE CITIZEN, Apr. 27, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/
printable/201004280004.html (citing the World Investment Report of 2009, which
found that Africa received only $88 billion of a total global FDI of $1.7 trillion in
2008).
21. E.g., Charles W. Corey, Diverse Investment Opportunities Springing Up
Across Africa: Investment Banker Says Ongoing Reforms in Africa Invite
Investment, AMERICA.GOV (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.america.gov/st/businessenglish/2008/October/20081016140446WCyeroC0.7312586.html; Louise Harris,
Africa Offers Several Investment Opportunities: Frost & Sullivan Says Water,
Energy, Telecom Options Available, SUITE101.COM (Dec. 22, 2009),
http://www.suite101.com/content/africa-offers-several-investment-opportunitiesa182225 (indicating that Frost & Sullivan reported investment opportunities in
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other Asian states, and as wages rise commensurately, Africa will
soon be the world’s last “major low-wage region.”22 Incentives are
growing for companies from member states of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) to outsource
work to Africa and to set up low-cost operations in the same way
such activities were shifted to Asia over the past three decades.23

B. RISKS
Although sub-Saharan Africa’s economies are primed for growth
and opportunities exist, the region presents unique challenges. The
continent cannot reach its full growth potential until the substantial
risks of investing in Africa are alleviated and the business
environment improves.24
1. Corruption
Corruption remains the largest risk factor, slowing growth and
development and threatening to stymie Africa’s strong rebound from
the global recession. Africa loses an estimated 25% of its GDP to
corruption, roughly U.S. $148 billion.25 According to Transparency
International, Nigeria loses “nearly 40[%] of its wealth” to
corruption and government mismanagement.26 A 2002 study by the
African Union estimated that corruption costs the continent $150
billion per year; by comparison, OECD reported that sub-Saharan
Africa in telecommunications and technology, biofuels, renewable energy, and
water sectors); Mobile Growth ‘Fastest in Africa’, BBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2005),
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/43
31863.stm (arguing that telecommunications remains a high-growth industry on
the continent).
22. See Collier, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining further that per capita GDP in
China is already higher than the world average).
23. See id. at 4 (indicating that this shift is also logical because Africa’s
coastline is enormous and more proximate than Asia to European and North
American markets).
24. See For African Business, Ending Corruption is ‘Priority Number One’,
supra note 3, at 8 (citing corruption as the chief concern of African leaders, who
acknowledged that reducing corruption is a prerequisite for creating an enabling
business environment).
25. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Change or the Illusion of Change: The War Against
Official Corruption in Africa, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 697, 728 (2006).
26. Amanda Wheat, West Africa: The BP Oil Spill Spells Disaster for Region,
MEDIAGLOBAL (June 18, 2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/2010062
00023.html.
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Africa received a total of $22.5 billion in aid from developed
countries in 2008.27
Corruption—a lack of accountability and rule of law—takes root
at the top of African political systems and creeps down to impact all
aspects of society.28 When asked why political opposition was
suppressed in Congo, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who has
been at Congo’s helm for twenty-six years, responded that “[i]n
Africa, we don’t like that sort of thing, we don’t admire that. Our
values are that we respect our leaders. In this regard, Africa will
never imitate Europe, you can be sure of that.”29 Additionally,
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, Angola’s leader for over thirty
years, recently declared in an address to his nation that
“democracy . . . was imposed on Africa by the West.”30 Angola
provides a particularly alarming example of how corruption can take
root and drain public coffers; in the past, “billions of dollars in oil
revenues illegally bypassed Angola’s central bank and disappeared,”
even as the country’s development indicators sagged near the lowest
in the world.31
Corruption continues to pose significant risks for investors in
Africa, and the continent faces an uphill battle in rebuilding the rule
of law. The cycle of corruption is a difficult one to stop; once a
27. Elizabeth Blunt, Corruption ‘Costs Africa Billions’, BBC NEWS (Sept. 18,
2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2265387.stm, cited in Stephanie Hanson,
Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 6,
2009),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/19984/corruption_in_subsaharan_africa
.html; Development Aid at its Highest Level Ever in 2008, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3343,en_2649_34487_42458595_1_1_1_1,00
.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011), cited in Hanson, supra.
28. See generally Hanson, supra note 27 (tracing multi-million dollar
corruption from political leaders to low-level bribes by local officials).
29. JOHN GHAZVINIAN, UNTAPPED: THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA’S OIL 124
(2007) (quoting Sassou-Nguesso further as stating: “You think it’s a good thing to
insult one’s leader on every street corner? You think it fitting that the little local
magistrate can come knocking on the door of the president to summon him to
court?”).
30. Id. at 147 (presenting this quote as the President’s response, in part, to
American efforts to convince the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
to hold elections).
31. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN
ANGOLA”: AN UPDATE 1 (2010) [hereinafter “TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN ANGOLA”], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/angola0410webwcover_1.pdf.
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country is perceived as corrupt, investors are more likely to expect
the solicitation of bribes and therefore preemptively offer bribes,
adding fuel to the fire.32 For example, Nigeria has developed,
correctly or incorrectly, a widely-held reputation as one of the most
corrupt countries in Africa.33 This prompted the U.S. Secretary of
State—America’s highest ranking diplomat—to say in January 2010
that the level of Nigeria’s “corruption is unbelievable.”34 Once a
reputation for corruption builds and investors and businesses attach
the label to a given country, it becomes exceedingly difficult to shed
the moniker. Changing these deeply-held perceptions requires
authentic, holistic reform, consistent demonstration of those reforms
to investors, and plenty of time.35
2. Other Perils
In addition to corruption, other related factors pose risks to
investors and businesses seeking to profit on the continent. Unstable
political and business environments and uncertain sources of
information pose significant hazards.36 One of the most insidious
factors businesses encounter is poor infrastructure. African
32. Bernadette M. Gawanas, Op-Ed., Africa: What Really Causes Corruption
in Africa? Particularly in Country?, NEW ERA (Dec. 4, 2009), available at
http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200912071167.html (describing the snowball
effect of corruption and how it becomes an acceptable way of life).
33. Corruption
Perceptions
Index
2010,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L,
http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (ranking Nigeria 134 out of 178 countries in terms of
corruption with a score of 2.4 out of 10).
34. Gus Lubin & Lawrence Delevingne Corruption In Africa’s ‘Best Countries’
Can Still Crush Investors, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2010, 8: 42AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/corruption-in-africas-best-countries-can-stillcrush-investors-2010-2#no-5-nigeria-6 (indicating the full quote from Secretary
Clinton as: “There has to be a recognition that in the last 10 years, a lot of
indicators about the quality of life in Nigeria have gone in the wrong direction.
Quality-of-life factors in the country like literacy and health care are deteriorating.
The corruption is unbelievable.”).
35. See Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corruption in Nigeria: A
Reform Prospectus 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 397, 406-07 (2002) (emphasizing
that anti-corruption laws must be combined with substantial changes to cultural
attitudes and economic systems).
36. See id. at 413 (explaining that dishonest leadership and the marketplace
ideology encourage the acceptance of bribes as inevitable and make it easier to
operate through corruption where there is escape from regulations through payoffs
or kickbacks).
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infrastructure, in particular power generation, notably lags behind
other developing regions.37 Poor power infrastructure alone lops off
as much as 1-2% of Africa’s GDP.38 The continent also suffers from
markedly poor road and air networks.39 Overall, poor infrastructure
depresses productivity in Africa by as much as 40%.40
It is corruption, however, that poses the biggest threat to subSaharan Africa’s future. Corruption erodes the rule of law, the
foundation for economic development.41 Poor infrastructure, along
with numerous other negative social troubles, is exacerbated by high
levels of corruption.42 Corruption and its associated ills not only
spook investors, but also relegate the countries in which they flourish
to sub-par growth and consistently poor standards of living.43 With
few exceptions, including South Africa, Mauritius, Seychelles and
Botswana, the peoples of sub-Saharan Africa remain extraordinarily
poor.44 Additionally, over half of the world’s poor live in Africa,
limiting the ability of domestic consumers to help drive economic
37. See AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT & THE WORLD BANK, supra
note 7, at 1, 3 (noting that although sub-Saharan Africa possessed almost three
times the power generating capacity per million people as compared to South Asia
in 1970, by 2000, South Asia possessed twice the capacity per million people than
Africa).
38. Id. at 5.
39. See Kamndaya, supra note 20 (reporting that most current transit links only
connect African countries to Europe and the United States, but not other parts of
Africa).
40. AGENCE FRANÇAISE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT & THE WORLD BANK, supra note
7, at 2 (adding that infrastructure constraints are at least as important as crime,
bureaucracy, corruption, and financial markets in depressing productivity).
41. See Reagan R. Demas, All Hands on Deck: Collaborative Global Strategies
in the Battle Against Corruption and Human Trafficking in Africa, 6 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 204, 205-06 (2008) (detailing the consequences of such corruption as
including rights violations, prevalent crime, and even war).
42. See id. (describing the mutually reinforcing cycle of destabilized political
systems, decreased investment, and widespread poverty).
43. See Gbenga Lawal, Corruption and Development in Africa: Challenges for
Political and Economic Change, 2 HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. J. 1, 4 (2007) (discussing
the social and economic effects of corruption, including the lack of social services
typically available to the poor in less-corrupt states).
44. Xavier Sala-i-Martin, The World Distribution of Income: Falling Poverty
and . . . Convergence, Period(*) 22 (Oct. 9, 2005) (draft paper) (on file with
Columbia University), available at http://www.columbia.edu/~xs23/papers/pdfs/
World_Income_Distribution_QJE.pdf (indicating that these countries were the
only African countries where the poverty headcounts did not increase from 19702000).
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growth and serving to maintain the continent’s dependence on
exports.45
3. The Curse of Resources
Somewhat paradoxically, one of sub-Saharan Africa’s largest
economic engines actually inhibits breakout economic growth. The
continent’s focus on the extraction and exportation of oil and other
natural resources hinders growth by subjecting it to the “resource
curse,”46 and reduces incentives for the United States and other
Western oil-importers to take effective stands against corruption in
Africa.47
Today, sub-Saharan Africa’s economies are driven primarily by
the exportation of natural resources, including oil, metals, and
wood.48 The global petroleum industry since 1990 invested well over
$20 billion in African exploration and production activities.49 The
heavy exportation of natural resources inflates the value of a
45. See U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., THE LEAST DEVELOPED
COUNTRIES REPORT 2002: ESCAPING THE POVERTY TRAP, at 137, U.N. Doc
UNCTAD/LDC/2002, U.N. Sales No. E.02.II.D.13 (2002) (noting the correlation
between poverty and export commodity dependence through trade mechanisms);
see also Sala-i-Martin, supra note 44, at 22–23 (observing that while only 10% of
the world’s population lives in Africa, those people account for 67.8% of the
world’s poor).
46. See, e.g., ‘The Resource Curse’: Why Africa’s Oil Riches Don’t Trickle
(Oct.
31,
2007),
Down
to
Africans,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1830 [hereinafter ‘The
Resource Curse’] (indicating that Africa’s people are hurt by the resource curse
due to exports of oil). The resource curse, also known as “Dutch disease,” was first
recognized in the 1960s in the Netherlands, where the discovery of large quantities
of natural gas led to an increase in the value of its currency and made other Dutch
exports less competitive on the global market. Id.; Collier, supra note 5, at 4 n.2.
47. See Kirsten Korosec, Bono Versus Big Oil: The Resource Curse Battle
Moves to the SEC, BNET (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/cleanenergy/bono-versus-big-oil-the-resource-curse-battle-moves-to-the-sec/2284
(reporting the political tension between western petroleum companies and anticorruption legislation due to the potential for companies to report profits from oil
and gas extraction).
48. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], THE RISE OF CHINA AND
INDIA: WHAT’S IN IT FOR AFRICA? 3 (2006) [hereinafter THE RISE OF CHINA AND
INDIA],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/62/36905545.pdf
(explaining that these export markets are driven increasingly by Asian and Indian
demand).
49. ‘The Resource Curse’, supra note 46 (estimating that another $50 billion
will be invested in Africa before the end of the decade).
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country’s currency and incentivizes workers to shift into the
booming resource business, wilting other lower-paying but vital
domestic industries such as agriculture and textiles.50 The extinction
of local staple industries leads to the importation of goods previously
produced and sold within the country.51 In essence, when a poor or
mismanaged country discovers substantial, exportable natural
resources, market forces make it harder for other domestic industries
to survive, and locals are forced to purchase more expensive
imported staple goods.52 Gabon, which produces and exports
approximately 300,000 barrels of oil a day, is covered by jungle in
which bananas thrive.53 Nevertheless, the country imports most of its
bananas from Cameroon because the Gabonese banana industry
withered after oil became the biggest industry.54
More importantly, in countries without an enforced rule of law or
accountable leadership, the extraction and exportation of natural
resources and resulting influx of foreign currency results in a
frenzied political contest for the incoming cash.55 Where they can get
away with it, these officials, such as Presidents, Ministers of Mines,
or other high-ranking officeholders with control over commodities
and access to incoming foreign currency, siphon away valuable funds
that would otherwise go into public coffers and stash it away in
foreign bank accounts or French villas.56 Opaque public bookkeeping
and a lack of revenue monitoring make it more likely that these funds
end up in the pockets of the elite instead of funding the country’s

50. See Patrick J. Keenan, Curse or Cure? China, Africa, and the Effects of
Unconditioned Wealth, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 84, 105-106 (2009) (labeling this
labor shift as the “resource movement effect” and describing a related “spending
effect” through which higher incomes from resource sales increase the purchase of
goods); see also THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA, supra note 48, at 3 (explaining
that most of Africa’s trade growth is tied to raw material exports).
51. See THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA, supra note 48, at 4 (noting that the
impact on local industry is particularly sharp in the labor-intensive garment sector).
52. ‘The Resource Curse’, supra note 46.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Collier, supra note 5, at 3 (explaining that the commodity booms in the
1970s were not “harnessed for transformative growth” but instead produced a
highly competitive and ugly competition for revenues).
56. See ‘The Resource Curse’, supra note 46 (arguing that profits from oil and
other foreign investments corrupt government officials and that much of the funds
corruptly obtained by these officials are stashed in Western banks).
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health, education, or infrastructure.57
Angola presents a particularly bleak example of the conditions in
which the resource curse can take hold. Oil accounts for “85[%] of
public revenue in Angola,”58 and the country’s leadership relies on a
centrally controlled stream of revenue from oil and gas sales and not
on domestic taxation or a diversified economy.59 As Human Rights
Watch determined, “[Angola’s] rulers have unique opportunities for
self-enrichment and corruption, especially because there is not
enough transparency or political space for the public to hold them
accountable. There are enormous disincentives to relinquish political
power because it is also a path to economic enrichment.”60 Angola’s
President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, has entered his fourth decade of
rule and while the country’s records are sufficiently opaque to
prevent verification, he is widely believed to be one of the richest
men in Africa, if not the world.61 Despite Angola’s oil and the wealth
of its elite, “68[%] of the population survives on less than a dollar a
day.”62 As industries shrivel and society becomes dependent upon a
revenue stream in the control of an elite few, it is not hard to see how
a deepening “reliance on commodity [exports] has been shown to be
at odds with poverty reduction.”63
The extraction and exportation of oil and other commodities, while
today one of the few methods of wealth transfer from developed
57. See id. (explaining that the government officials get away with this because
the governments are not dependent on income taxes and, thus, are not held
accountable to the people).
58. Mario de Queiroz, Angola: Wealth for Just a Few, INTER PRESS SERV.
NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 15, 2005), http://ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews
=21948. Angola contributed an estimated $17.8 billion from oil sales between
1997 and 2002 to its state coffers. Id.
59. “TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ANGOLA”, supra note 31, at 3
(noting that a centrally managed revenue stream provides government elites with
unchecked control).
60. Id.
61. David Blair, Africa’s Oil Boom Shifts Balance of Power,
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (July 17, 2008, 10:07 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/mews/
worldnews/africaandindianocean/angola/2420477/africas-oil-boom-shifts-balanceof-power.html.
62. See Queiroz, supra note 58 (indicating that the country’s population is in
need because, despite the oil and diamond revenue, Angola’s government spends
only half that spent by neighboring countries on basic services such as health and
education for its people).
63. THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA, supra note 48, at 4.
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countries to African countries, fails on its own to foster sustainable
development in Africa.64 Nigeria raked in approximately $700 billion
in oil revenue, yet the country still ranks only 158th out of 182
countries on the United Nations’ Human Development Index.65 In the
process, Nigerians face total yearly oil spills of eleven million
gallons—the equivalent to an Exxon Valdez spill—every year.66 But
the global thirst for oil continues, and African oil reserves are
tempting alternatives for a world dominated by Middle Eastern oil.67
In 1960, the world consumed twenty-one million barrels of oil per
day; by 2004, consumption increased by 285% to eighty-one million
barrels per day.68 African oil output is estimated to almost double
between 2002 and 2025.69 A “third of the world’s new discoveries of
oil since 2000 have taken place in Africa,”70 and analysts believe the
64. See AFR. OIL POLICY INITIATIVE GRP., AFRICAN OIL: A PRIORITY FOR U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT 12 (2002), available at
http://www.iasps.org/strategic/africawhitepaper.pdf (”Oil revenues have helped to
prop up dictatorships (Nigeria under Sani Abacha), prolong wars (Angolan civil
war), devastate residential environments (the Niger Delta), and obstruct
transparency in commercial transactions (the primary reason for World Bank
involvement in Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project).”).
65. U.N. DEV. PROGRAM [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2009:
OVERCOMING BARRIERS: HUMAN MOBILITY AND DEVELOPMENT 169 (2009)
DEVELOPMENT
REPORT
2009],
available
at
[hereinafter
HUMAN
http://hdr.undp.org/en/meia/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf (placing Nigeria in the
“Medium Human Development” category, though only one spot above the “Low
Human Development” category); Michael Watts, Nigeria at a Tipping Point,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2009, 5:17 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
michael-watts/nigeria-at-a-tipping-poin_b_257969.html (citing an International
Monetary Fund report which states that Nigeria has accumulated $700 billion in
revenue since 1960, but more than three quarters of that revenue accrues to only
1% of the population).
66. Adam Nossiter, Far From Gulf, a Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17
nigeria.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print (”Perhaps no place on earth has been as
battered by oil, experts say, leaving residents [of Nigeria] astonished at the nonstop
attention paid to the gusher half a world away in the Gulf of Mexico.”).
67. Recent political tensions and increased uncertainty in certain Middle Eastern
oil producing states (including Libya, Bahrain and Iran) will likely increase the
demand for African oil in the future.
68. Michael Klare & Daniel Volman, The African ‘Oil Rush’ and US National
Security, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 609, 610 (2006) (explaining that petroleum accounts
for 40% of the global energy supply).
69. Id. at 611 (estimating that, in that time frame, Africa’s oil production will
increase from 8.6 million barrels per day to 16.4 million barrels per day).
70. ‘The Resource Curse’, supra note 46.
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continent could possess considerable undiscovered reserves.71 The
continent’s oil is of high quality,72 and “under almost any scenario
Africa will become an increasingly important supplier to the world’s
energy markets in the next decade.”73

C. IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW
Africa’s growth is dependent upon the establishment of a rule of
law and official accountability.74 Sub-Saharan Africa’s emergence
from the global recession of 2008-09 and continued economic
development will hinge on the success of its battle against
corruption, particularly in light of past misappropriation of oil
revenue and the potential for further economic harm under the
resource curse.75
However, the battle against corruption in Africa will not be easy.
The presence of substantial natural resource wealth controlled by an
elite few, without an enforced rule of law, encourages private actors
to bribe those unaccountable elite in exchange for access to those
resources.76 There is a critical need for consistent, credible
enforcement of corruption laws on both the supply- and demandsides,77 including laws regulating the behavior of multinationals and
71. See Stephanie Hanson, China, Africa, and Oil, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (June 6, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/china_africa_
and_oil.html (noting, however, that in 2008 Africa held only 9% of the world’s
known reserves as compared to 62% held by Middle East).
72. See NAT’L ENERGY POLICY DEV. GRP., NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY 8-11
(2001), available at http://www.ne.doe.gov/pdfFiles/nationalEnergyPolicy.pdf
(explaining that such quality is important in order to take advantage of refining
centers on the U.S. east coast).
73. The Gulf of Guinea and U.S. Strategic Energy Policy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on International Economic Policy, Export and Trade Promotion of the
S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 11-12 (2004) (statement of John R.
Brodman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for International Energy Policy).
74. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
75. See supra Section I.B.3.
76. See Keenan, supra note 50, at 107 (“[A]s to corruption, there is evidence
that natural resource wealth creates strong incentives for economic actors to bribe
those who control access to the resources.”); see also Elissaios Papyrakis & Reyer
Gerlagh, The Resource Curse Hypothesis and its Transmission Channels, 32 J.
COMP. ECON. 181, 188 (2004) (citing a number of economic studies on the rentseeking competition induced by natural resource wealth).
77. The demand-side of bribery refers to public officials that “demand” bribes
from economic actors. The supply-side refers to economic actors that “supply”
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other companies operating in Africa and laws prohibiting public
officials in Africa from demanding or accepting bribes.78

II. THE SUPPLY-SIDE BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION IN AFRICA
The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)79 and
related laws in other OECD80 countries are the primary supply-side
anti-corruption tools in use today. The U.S. government is
particularly aggressive in prosecuting private companies and
individuals under the FCPA, which provides harsh penalties for
offering bribes to public officials around the world, including in
Africa.81
The FCPA prohibits U.S. issuers, domestic concerns, and other
non-U.S. persons and entities, as well as their officers, directors,
employees, and agents, from corruptly offering or giving anything of
value to foreign officials to obtain or retain business.82 Though there
is one exception and two affirmative defenses built into the law, in
general the FCPA imposes strict anti-bribery and accounting
obligations on activities conducted by companies having sufficient
connection to the United States.83 Moreover, the supply-side antibribes to public officials. See Demas, supra note 41, at 217–18.
78. See id. (providing internal affairs bureaus and the FCPA as examples of
demand- and supply–side anti-corruption measures).
79. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006).
80. OECD member countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. Ratification of
the Convention on the OECD, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/33/
0,3343,en_2649_33731_45248993_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
81. See Jeffrey Cramer, The FCPA Landscape Has Changed: Trends in
Enforcement, KROLL (Apr. 2010), http://www.kroll.com/about/library/fraud/
Apr2010/fcpa.aspx (noting that sixty cases were brought since 2005, with penalties
sometimes in excess of $1.6 billion).
82. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2006) (defining bribes to include
the giving of anything of value to an official, political party, or other person in
order to improperly influence the official).
83. The FCPA does not apply to “facilitating” or “expediting” payments to
government officials for performing essentially clerical activities or “routine
governmental actions.” See id. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b). Examples include small,
one-time payments for vehicle registration, visa renewal, and utilities service. The
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bribery standards contained in the FCPA, in theory, are broadly
accepted across the West and beyond.84 The recently-passed and
soon to be implemented U.K. Bribery Act imposes similar, if not
more aggressive, standards on companies and individuals falling
within its jurisdiction.85

specific definition of what constitutes a “facilitating” payment is unclear from the
law, and in practice the scope of the exception has been narrowing in the course of
government enforcement actions and settlements. David M. Howard & Elisa T.
Wiygul, FCPA Compliance: The Vanishing “Facilitating Payments” Exception?,
DECHERT ON POINT 3 (Apr. 2010), http://www.dechert.com/library/4-7-10-WCSLHoward_and_Wiygul-FCPA_ComplianceThe_Vanishing_Facilitating_Payments_Exception.pdf. Note also that most of these
payments, though not actionable under the FCPA, are likely prohibited by the law
of the African state in which they are paid. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Facilitation
Payments Still Leave Companies Vexed, COMPLIANCE WK. (Oct. 20, 2009),
http://www.complianceweek.com/article/5638/facilitation-payments-still-leavecompanies-vexed. The FCPA also provides for two affirmative defenses. First,
defendants can assert that the payment made was lawful under the written laws of
the foreign official’s country. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1). In
practice this is extremely rare, as few if any countries’ laws explicitly permit
bribery. Second, it is an affirmative defense to assert that a payment was a
“reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel and lodging expenses, . . .
related to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or
the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof.” See id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2).
84. FCPA anti-corruption standards are embodied in numerous international
instruments around the world. See, e.g., Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-39
(1998); Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43
(1998) [hereinafter Convention on Combating Bribery]; Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption ch. 2, art. 2, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173 [hereinafter Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption I]; Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4,
1999, E.T.S. No. 174; African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating
Corruption, opened for signature July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5; United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31,
2003); see also ASIAN DEV. BANK & ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION PLAN FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC Pillar 2 (2005),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/24/35021642.pdf.
85. See generally Bribery Act of 2010, c. 23, § 1 (U.K.). The UK law, passed
in 2010 and set to go into force in early 2011, is similar to the FCPA but (1) does
not contain a facilitating payments exception, (2) creates a new corporate offense
of failing to prevent bribery, and (3) includes provisions for private sector bribery
not involving government officials. Id. §§ 3, 7.
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A. SUPPLY-SIDE ANTI-BRIBERY ENFORCEMENT TRENDS
Enforcement of the FCPA continued to grow over the past decade
and shows no sign of abating.86 Recent enforcement of the FCPA can
be summarized in five key trends. First, the U.S. government
enforces the FCPA with ever-increasing vigor, imposing larger
penalties and bringing a growing number of actions against
individuals.87 Second, the U.S. government aggressively pursues its
jurisdiction over the activities of non-U.S. companies with operations
that touch upon the United States.88 Third, authorities in the United

86. See Cramer, supra note 81 (emphasizing that the number of investigations
and prosecutions of FCPA cases in the U.S. increased).
87. See Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, FCPA Digest Reports Increased
Prosecutions of Individuals, Emphasis on Industry Compliance, SHEARMAN &
STERLING LLP (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.shearman.com/FCPA-Digest-ReportsIncreased-Prosecutions-of-Individuals-Emphasis-on-Industry-Compliance-03-292010/ (indicating that the U.S. government charged sixteen individuals with
violations of the FCPA in 2008 and forty-two in 2009).
88. FCPA settlements in the first four months of 2010 included resolutions
with BAE (U.K.), Daimler (Germany), Technip (France), Panalpina (Switzerland),
Pride (U.S.), Alcatel-Lucent (France), and Snamprogetti/ENI (Netherlands/Italy).
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilt and Ordered
to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010) [hereinafter BAE Fine Press
Release],
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/March/10-crm209.html; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Daimler AG and Three Subsidiaries
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay $93.6
Million in Criminal Penalties (Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Daimler Fine Press
Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/April/10-crm-360.html;
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Technip S.A. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal Penalty (June 28,
2010)
[hereinafter
Technip
Fine
Press
Release],
available
at
http://justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/June/10-crm-751.html; Press Release, Dep’t of
Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight Forwarding Company Agree to
Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More Than $156 Million in
Criminal Penalties (November 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html; Press Release, Dep’t of Justice,
Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (December 27, 2010)
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html;
Litigation Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Snamprogetti
Netherlands, B.V. with Foreign Bribery and Related Accounting Violations and
ENI, S.p.A. with Books and Records and Internal Controls Violations—ENI and
Snamprogetti to Pay Jointly $125 Million in Disgorgement; Snamprogetti Also to
Pay a Criminal Penalty of $240 Million (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter
Snamprogetti/ENI Fine Press Release], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2010/lr21588.htm.
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States continue to encourage companies to disclose possible
misconduct and to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in
FCPA investigations.89 Fourth, there is increasing cooperation among
law enforcement agencies in the United States and beyond,
particularly in Europe.90 Finally, the U.S. government consistently
imposes a “probation period” on indicted companies, typically
utilizing independent monitors or other reporting mechanisms to
monitor progress of offending corporations for a fixed period beyond
the date of case settlement.91
While overall enforcement of the FCPA increased significantly
over the past decade, enforcement of the law against companies
operating in Africa is particularly pronounced. In the first four
months of 2010 alone, four noteworthy FCPA settlements were
released involving allegations of bribery in Africa, including: bribery
relating to the sale of an aircraft in South Africa; air traffic control
equipment in Tanzania; vehicles in Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Egypt;
and other assorted violations in Nigeria.92 These four cases alone
resulted in over $1.3 billion in fines paid.93
89. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, FCPA Research Stirs Debate on Voluntary
Disclosure, COMPLIANCE WK. (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/
blog/aguilar/2010/08/06/fcpa-research-stirs-debate-on-voluntarydisclosure/&printable=1 (discussing a U.S. government spokeswoman’s remarks in
August, 2010 indicating the U.S. Department of Justice “[has] and will continue to
encourage voluntary disclosures of possible FCPA violations”).
90. See Melissa Klein Aguilar, Innospec Settlement Shows Latest FCPA
Thinking, COMPLIANCE WK., June 2010, at 18, 18 (noting “the high degree of
cooperation among U.S. and British regulators” in a recent FCPA action).
91. E.g., BAE Fine Press Release, supra note 88; Daimler Fine Press Release,
supra note 87; Technip Fine Press Release, supra note 88. These press releases
outlined probation periods between two and three years and included an
independent monitor, third party compliance consultant, or other regular reporting
obligations to the U.S. government relating to compliance issues as well as
ongoing obligations to cooperate with other investigations and report potential
misconduct.
92. BAE Fine Press Release, supra note 88; Daimler Fine Press Release, supra
note 87; Technip Fine Press Release, supra note 88; Snamprogetti/ENI Fine Press
Release, supra note 88.
93. See BAE Fine Press Release, supra note 88 (indicating BAE paid a $450
million fine); Daimler Fine Press Release, supra note 88 (specifying that Daimler
paid $185 million in criminal and civil penalties); Technip Fine Press Release,
supra note 88 (noting that Technip was assessed a $240 million fine);
Snamprogetti/ENI Fine Press Release, supra note 88 (specifying that Snamprogetti
and ENI jointly paid $125 million in disgorgement and Snamprogetti paid a
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In the last two years alone, the U.S. Department of Justice has
imposed a total of $579 million in disgorgement and fines for
instances of bribery in Africa, including oil and gas bribes paid to
Nigerian officials dating back twenty years,94 kickbacks paid in
Nigeria relating to the purchase of law enforcement equipment,95
payments to Egyptian Air Force officials for an aerospace defense
services contract,96 and payments for the procurement of oil and gas
construction projects on Nigeria.97 Four additional settlements in
2007 involved companies bribing African officials in Rwanda,
Senegal, Angola, and Nigeria.98
criminal penalty of $240 million).
94. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty
to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb.
11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/February/09-crm112.html.
95. Complaint at 10, United States v. Bistrong, No. 1:10-CR-00021 (D.D.C.
Jan. 21, 2010) (reciting the kickback agreement in Nigeria, but noting that it
ultimately did not lead to a purchase).
96. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Sues Former President of the
United industrial Corporation Subsidiary for Authorizing the Payment of Foreign
Bribes (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/
lr21063.htm (stating that the bribe was for a business award relating to an aircraft
depot in Cairo).
97. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Willbros Group Inc. Enter Deferred
Prosecution Agreement and Agrees to Pay $22 Million Penalty for FCPA
Violations (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
2008/May/08-crm-417.html (describing the agreement to award a $387 million gas
pipeline contract for the Eastern Gas Gathering System to Willbros).
98. See, e.g., Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Institutes
Enforcement Action Against Bristow Group for Improper Payments to Nigerian
Government Officials and Other Violations (Sept. 26, 2007), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-201.htm (indicating that the settlement with
Bristow Group involved payments to Nigerian tax officials to reduce tax liability);
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Paradigm B.V. Agrees to Pay $1 Million Penalty
to Resolve Foreign Bribery Issues in Multiple Countries (Sept. 24, 2007), available
at http://justice.gov/criminal/pr/2007/09/09-24-07paradigm-agree.pdf (noting that
in the settlement with Paradigm, who voluntarily disclosed its illegal activities, the
company paid Nigerian politicians $100,000–$200,000 in order to obtain an oil
and gas services contract); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Two Former Executives
of ITXC Corp Plead Guilty and Former Regional Director Sentenced in Foreign
Bribery Scheme (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/
July/07_Crm_556.html (detailing that the settlement with former executives of
ITXC Corporation alleged payments were made to employees of state-owned
telecommunications carriers in Nigeria, Rwanda, and Senegal); Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bribing Kazakh
Official and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest Combined
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Perhaps the most intriguing recent Africa-related FCPA case stems
from a U.S. government sting in which twenty-two individuals were
indicted for offering to pay money in exchange for law enforcement
supply contracts.99 The sting involved a fake African Minister of
Defense from an African country offering to give law enforcement
equipment supply contracts to the defendants in exchange for a
kickback.100 The sting and resulting prosecutions broke new ground
in FCPA enforcement, marking the first time U.S. officials utilized
such tactics.101
The heavy enforcement of the FCPA and other supply-side anticorruption laws against corporations and individuals operating in
Africa is not surprising given the high incidence of corruption on the
continent. FCPA practitioners attest to the fact that the high
enforcement levels contributed to a substantial growth in the breadth
and depth of the anti-corruption compliance programs of U.S. and
European companies operating in emerging markets.102 Companies,
particularly those with substantial connections to the United States
and significant operations in Africa or other emerging markets, are
dedicating more and more financial and human resources to
complying with the FCPA and preventing, detecting, and responding

Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case (April 26, 2007), available at
http://justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_Crm_296.html; Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Baker Hughes with Foreign Bribery and With
Violating 2001 Commission Cease-and-Desist Order (Apr. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm (indicating that the settlement
with Baker Hughes Inc. alleged payments in Kazakhstan as well as payments made
to the state oil company Sonangol in Angola and Nigerian officials in exchange for
business).
99. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and
Employees of Military and Law Enforcement Products Companies Charged in
Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available at http://justice.gov/opa/pr/
2010/January/10_crm_048.html (recognizing that the case was the largest DOJ
anti-bribery case against individuals).
100. See id. (stating that the investigation also involved an undercover FBI agent
acting as a middleman in the bribe scheme).
101. Id.
102. See Frederic D. Firestone & Michael A. Ungar, DOJ and SEC will
Significantly Increase FCPA Enforcement Efforts, MCDERMOTT, WILL & EMERY
(Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/
object_id/c2bea4e1-2573-4e83-b0bf-8086e0001d96.cfm (indicating that such
compliance programs should include “strong internal controls, procedures and
internal audits”).
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to incidents of corruption within their businesses.103 Many of these
companies are even ceasing operations in countries with particularly
acute corruption risks, often at substantial cost and future profit
loss.104

B. FCPA ENFORCEMENT CHALLENGES
Bribery cannot be consummated without both a supplier and a
demanding party. The enforcement of laws discouraging private
actors from supplying bribes to public officials will theoretically lead
to a decrease in corruption on the continent.105 However, critical
fissures in the application of the FCPA’s anti-corruption principles
are limiting the effectiveness of such supply-side enforcement and
ultimately hampering the continent’s ability to stage a strong
recovery from the global recession.106
The principal problem with the FCPA today is the uneven
enforcement of its supply side anti-corruption parameters.107
Although the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA is broad, there are
103. See Fidelis I. Agbapuruonwu, The Unique Challenges of FCPA
Compliance for U.S. Companies Doing Business in Sub-Saharan Africa, MAYER
BROWN (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp
?id=8636&nid=6 (encouraging companies with operations in Africa to protect
against FCPA violations through proactive steps that are sensitive to sub-Saharan
Africa’s unique problems).
104. See, e.g., Panalpina Quits Nigeria, THE FCPA BLOG (Aug. 18, 2008, 10:10
PM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/8/19/panalpina-quits-nigeria.html
(discussing the withdrawal from Nigeria by Panalpina World Transport, a Swiss
logistics industry leader, due to compliance concerns, and quoting Panalpina’s
CEO as saying: “Admittedly foreign companies operate in an ongoing uncertain
and hard to assess legal environment in Nigeria. This makes it difficult for
Panalpina to offer both a comprehensive service portfolio and at the same time
meet the high ethical standards as outlined in Panalpina’s Code of Business
Conduct . . . .”).
105. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Law and Economics of Bribery
and Extortion, 6 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 217 (2010), available at
http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102209152942.
106. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text; Jack Gage, The Most
Corrupt Countries, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2009, 5:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
2009/03/20/most-corrupt-countries-bizcountries09-business-washington-corruptcountries.html (reiterating that corruption continues to significantly prevent
economic development in Africa).
107. See infra Part IV (analyzing the inconsistency of application in
enforcement actions).
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limits to its application. In particular, the FCPA can only be enforced
against companies listed on U.S. exchanges or with operations
touching upon the United States.108 As a result, while the law is
enforced heavily against U.S. and European companies with
substantial operations touching upon the United States, very few
cases are pursued against other foreign companies, such as Chinese
or Russian companies.109 At the same time, many of these countries,
including China, lack FCPA-equivalent legislation and therefore do
not enforce anti-corruption standards on the operations of their own
companies in Africa.110 This irregular enforcement limits the ability
of the FCPA to achieve its ultimate objective—that is, decreasing the
incidence of official corruption in Africa and other jurisdictions
around the world. Instead, it tends to place those companies
operating in Africa with a U.S. connection at a competitive
disadvantage.111 Ultimately, the current supply-side anti-corruption
enforcement environment is unsustainable, and the future of the
corruption battle and economic development in Africa hinges on
change.
Despite the fact that thirty-eight OECD countries signed the 1997
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions,112 few are noticeably enforcing
108. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), (g), 78dd-2(a), (i), 78dd-3(a) (2006) (asserting
FCPA jurisdiction over U.S. issuers, domestic concerns, and foreign persons using
the U.S. mails or interstate commerce).
109. See supra notes 92-104 and accompanying text.
110. See Sam Eastwood, Aiding Progress in Africa: Anti-Corruption Efforts for
a Diverse Continent, in UNDERSTANDING ANTI-CORRUPTION ISSUES IN AFRICA:
AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND UPCOMING TRENDS 21, 33
(2010) (indicating that China’s laws focus on domestic corruption and lack
applicability to Chinese companies operating abroad).
111. Soren Lindstrom & Curtis Riddle, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A
Pickle in M&A Transactions, THE M&A LAW., May 2008, at 6, 10 (concluding
that risks and uncertainties, at least for U.S. companies contemplating mergers
with or acquisitions of foreign entities, could be alleviated by the DOJ and SEC
through “greater transparency in the interpretation and enforcement of the FCPA,”
but for the time being U.S. companies continue to operate at a competitive
disadvantage).
112. Ratification Status as of March 2009, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2011); see TRANSPARENCY
INT’L, PROGRESS REPORT 2009: OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION 6 (2009)
PROGRESS
REPORT
2009],
available
at
[hereinafter
OECD
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2009/oecd_pr_2009 (covering
the enforcement status of thirty-six of the parties and questioning whether
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foreign official bribery laws.113 In fact, the OECD Working Group on
Bribery admitted in June 2010 that “most of its member nations
failed to levy a single penalty since the group established its AntiBribery Convention a decade ago.”114 Of all foreign bribery
investigations brought against non-U.S. companies or individuals,
75% were conducted by the United States under the FCPA.115
Transparency International found that “[eighteen] of the original
[thirty-four] OECD signatory nations to the Convention . . . have
taken little or no action in enforcing the national anti-bribery laws”
outlined in the agreement,116 while eleven countries moderately
enforce but not at a “high enough level to provide effective
deterrence against foreign bribery.”117 In fact, not long ago, offering
bribes to public officials in Africa “was a perfectly normal way of
doing business in many OECD countries.”118 At the time the OECD
anti-bribery Convention was signed in 1997, half of OECD countries
allowed bribes paid to foreign officials to be deducted from taxes.119
enforcement is improving or deteriorating).
113. See OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2009, supra note 112, at 8 (indicating that
Transparency International reported in 2009 that “[t]he Convention is still far from
achieving the goal of ending bribery in international business transactions” and
classified only four countries as active enforcers and twenty-one as having little or
no enforcement).
114. Channing Turner, OECD: Few Nations Punish Bribery, MAIN JUSTICE
(June 15, 2010, 6:10 PM), http://mainjustice.com/2010/06/15/oecd-few-nationspunish-foreign-bribery (citing OECD WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY, ANNUAL
REPORT (2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/45460981.pdf).
Although overall enforcement levels are increasing—263 foreign public corruption
investigations were launched and 256 cases were brought in 2008, these cases
involved only nineteen OECD countries. The Long Arm of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2010, at 8, available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2010/November/08.pdf.
115. Turner, supra note 114 (citing a report by TRACE International).
116. Skip Kaltenheuser, Anti-corruption—US leads the way, INT’L BAR ASS’N
(April 2010), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=21F61c450318041F6-89f8-3E8C01EC57B1. Conversely, “[o]f all the OECD enforcement
cases since convention ratification a decade ago, the US, with about a tenth of total
exports of the OECD nations, has logged half of the OECD enforcement cases.” Id.
117. OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2009, supra note 112, at 8.
118. Martine Milliet-Einbinder, Writing Off Tax Deductibility, 220 OECD
OBSERVER, Apr. 2000, at 38, 38 .
119. See id. (noting that even where bribes were not deductible, they were often
classified as gifts or entertainment expenses, such as in the Czech Republic and
Japan, respectively, and therefore nondeductible for reasons other than their moral
repugnancy).
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Transparency International’s recent warning regarding the
effectiveness and future of foreign public bribery laws was dire:
“The present situation is dangerously unstable. Unless enforcement
is sharply increased, existing support will erode and the Convention
will fail.”120
Outside of OECD countries, prosecutions of foreign public bribery
are extremely rare.121 Even within countries committed to enforce
anti-bribery laws, the enforcement levels are patchy, and most
prosecutions involve U.S. companies or companies with substantial
operations in the United States. As noted by former head of the U.S.
Department of Justice’s FCPA enforcement section Mark
Mendelsohn, more even enforcement by countries outside of the
United States is critical: “I don’t think we need more instruments.
What we need is to see more global enforcement outside the [United
States]. Quite frankly, we need to see more of those OECD countries
prosecuting cases and fulfilling their obligations under the OECD
Convention. That’s what’s going to make the difference.”122

120. See generally OECD PROGRESS REPORT 2009, supra note 112 (reporting on
three non-OECD countries—China, Russia, and India—all of which have
substantial challenges to overcome if they are to make headway in the fight against
foreign bribery).
121. This article does not delve into the reasons foreign bribery laws are not
being passed or enforced evenly across the OECD or in other critical countries like
China and Russia. Instead, the article seeks to explain the negative impact of
irregular global enforcement and warn of future consequences if current trends do
not shift. There are a number of reasons many countries both inside and outside of
the OECD are not enforcing supply-side anti-corruption laws. These include
general challenges in defining and globalizing legal norms on corruption, privacy
laws, lack of whistleblower protections that make investigating improprieties
within companies difficult, and cultural norms that at times view bribery as a
“necessary evil” or even encourage it where a competitive advantage can be
achieved. See Joseph P. Covington & Iris E. Bennett, Signs of Life in International
Anti-Bribery Enforcement—Recent Enforcement of Anti-Bribery Laws Outside the
U.S. and Issues to Consider for a Multi-Jurisdictional Defense Strategy, JENNER &
BLOCK LLP (May 4, 2009), http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%
5CRelatedDocumentsPDFs1252%5C2499%5Ccovington%20%20bennett%20pdf.
pdf.
122. Kaltenheuser, supra note 116.

340

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:2

III. CHINA IN AFRICA: HOW IRREGULAR
ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-CORRUPTION
REGULATIONS CAN IMPACT AFRICA
Although there is evidence of heightened enforcement of foreign
public bribery laws against U.S. and some European companies
operating in Africa, little progress can be seen regarding companies
from non-OECD countries operating in Africa, in particular China.
To understand how such uneven enforcement of supply-side anticorruption laws can impact Africa, an overview of China’s presence
in Africa is instructive.

A. CHINA IN AFRICA: THE BASICS
China’s economic activities in Africa increased dramatically in
recent years. In 2006, Chinese companies were operating businesses
in Africa worth over $1 billion.123 Trade in the first three quarters of
2007 was over $50 billion, a 42% increase over the same time from
for the prior year.124 As of 2008, China was the second largest trading
partner on the African continent behind the United States.125 Overall,
trade flows between Africa and China expanded more than tenfold
between 2000 and 2009—to $107 billion.126 Many of the activities of
Chinese companies in Africa relate to the oil and gas industry,127 as
evidenced by China’s oil imports from Africa recently “increasing at
an annual compounded rate of [30%] . . . .”128
123. Keenan, supra note 50, at 91 (indicating this figure constituted the
aggregate worth of 750 Chinese companies operating in Africa).
124. Williams Wallis, Drawing Contours of a New World Order, FIN. TIMES
(U.K.), Jan. 24, 2008, at 1 (explaining that the growth resulted from increasing
Chinese demand for African natural resources and African demand for Chinese
low-cost manufactured goods).
125. Hanson, supra note 71 (reporting that most of the trade growth came from
raw materials such as oil, copper, timber, and diamonds).
126. Emma Graham-Harrison, China trade outweighs corruption fears for
Africa, REUTERS (Nov. 5, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?
aid=USTRES5A441220091105.
127. See HARRY G. BROADMAN, AFRICA’S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND INDIA’S NEW
ECONOMIC FRONTIER 78 (2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
AFRICAEXT/Resources/Africa_Silk_Road.pdf (mentioning that oil constituted
62% of African exports to China in 2004).
128. Id. at 77. In addition to petroleum ventures, Chinese companies also
invested in a variety of sectors, including telecommunications, apparel, fisheries
and seafood farming, tourism, and transport construction. Id. at 2.
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Despite its growing profile on the continent, China is still a
relative newcomer to Africa and remains well behind Western
countries in the competition for oil and gas concessions.129
Nevertheless, Chinese companies won half of all new public works
contracts in Africa in recent years.130 As Africa grows in importance
as a global oil supplier and as China’s ravenous economic engine
continues to demand greater quantities of fuel, Chinese involvement
in Africa is primed to continue its rapid expansion.131 The Chinese
government is supporting this growth by taking significant steps to
assist firms competing in Africa. The government provides political
risk investment insurance to Chinese firms in Africa who are
operating in China’s national interest,132 and it provides substantial
tax incentives for companies with African operations.133 Commercial
medium- and long-term loans from Chinese banks are also given to
Chinese companies with foreign investments.134
The Chinese government’s “African Policy,” issued in January
2006, describes the country’s objectives in engaging Africa.135 The
129. Many of the best concessions on the continent are held by U.S. or European
companies, leaving China to explore less desirable locations. Keenan, supra note
50, at 93–94; see Hanson, supra note 71 (indicating that in 2008, China held only
about 2% of Africa’s oil reserves, most of which were of little interest to
international oil companies because of size and quality or due to previous
relinquishment by such international oil companies).
130. See Wallis, supra note 124 (attributing the success of Chinese companies to
their lower overhead costs).
131. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates that China’s total energy
consumption will increase by over 150% between 2002 and 2025, and its net oil
consumption will rise by approximately 270% over the same period. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0484, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2005 89, 93 (2005).
132. See BROADMAN, supra note 127, at 268–69 (recognizing, however, that
most Chinese companies do not utilize this resource).
133. See UNDP, ASIAN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN AFRICA: TOWARDS A
NEW ERA OF COOPERATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, at 55, U.N. Sales
No. E.07.II.D.1 (2007) (explaining that all Chinese enterprises overseas are exempt
from corporate income tax for five successive years after beginning operations, and
thereafter as long as there is a double taxation treaty in place with the other
country).
134. Id.
135. See generally China’s African Policy, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Jan. 12, 2006), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/end/
zxxx/t230615.htm (describing the principles governing the China-Africa exchange
as sincerity, friendship, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity, common prosperity,
common development, mutual support, close coordination, and the “one China
principle”).
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document’s foundation is the principle of non-intervention in the
affairs of African states—or, in other words, China’s “respect[] [for]
African countries’ independent choice of the road of
development.”136 As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said in November
2009, “China’s involvement in Africa is sincere with no strings
attached—it isn’t political.”137 As a result, the Chinese do not view
their economic or diplomatic activity in Africa as a vehicle to pass
judgment on Africa’s concentration of flawed democracies and
outright authoritarian regimes.138 By its own declared policy, the
Chinese government does not desire to eradicate public corruption in
Africa,139 and consequently does not impose negative consequences
on its enterprises working in Africa when they pay bribes or engage
in other acts of corruption on the continent.140 Nor does China
hesitate to strike lucrative business deals with regimes spurned by the
West, including Zimbabwe and Sudan.141

B. DEFENDING CHINA IN AFRICA
Despite China’s clear disinterest in changing the policies of
African states, a number of commentators defend China’s activities
in Africa. Some point out that China’s investment in Africa’s
infrastructure, including construction of roads and bridges, fills a
136. Id.
137. Chinese Investment in Africa Faces Corruption Charges, ALTERNATIVE
ENERGY AFR. (May 12, 2010), http://www.ae-africa.com/read_article.php?
NID=2026&PHPSESSID=c64070eecdf6ae22092538c10f399b98.
138. See Keenan, supra note 50, at 95 (describing Chinese investment in Africa
as pure capitalism, free from conditions, and as refreshing to African leaders).
139. See Graham-Harrison, supra note 126 (explaining that China’s dealings
with other nations do not include conditions based on standards of human rights or
governance because of its “long-standing pledge of ‘non-interference’ in the affairs
of other nations”). One of the few conditions China does impose on any African
country with which it works is that the country recognizes Taiwan as a part of
greater China. See China’s African Policy, supra note 135 (“The Chinese
Government appreciates the fact that the overwhelming majority of African
countries abide by the one China principle, refuse to have official relations and
contacts with Taiwan and support China’s great cause of reunification.”).
140. See generally China’s African Policy, supra note 135 (lacking a policy
regarding consequences of corrupt dealings).
141. See generally China to Search for Oil in Sudan, BBC NEWS (July 2, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6261418.stm (reporting an oil deal between China’s
biggest oil company and Sudan); Zimbabwe Signs China Energy Deal, BBC NEWS
(June 12, 2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/5071824.stm (reporting
an energy deal between China and Zimbabwe worth $1.3 billion).
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critical need on the continent.142 While the Chinese government
disclaims any interest in altering the policies or practices of its
African trading partners,143 China does highlight the ability of its
investments in Africa to reduce poverty on the continent.144
There are also those who point out the general hypocrisy of the
West in criticizing China’s aggressive, market-driven activities in
Africa, asserting that the United States and Europe historically
behaved and continue to behave in a similar fashion.145 They
consider the “alarmist” Western view of China’s activities in Africa
as a product of fear—particularly fear of stronger competition on the
continent. One Western banker was quoted as saying, “[j]ust because
another competitor has arrived doesn’t warrant this specter of the
Chinese resource monster stomping all over Africa you see in the
media.”146 Others do not directly counter the claim that China
supports rogue states but simply note that China is not the only
player in this unsavory game. One commentator suggests that the
United States assigns moral criticism selectively, citing U.S. support
for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and flatly declares that “China [is] not
unique in cutting deals with bad governments and providing them
arms.”147
And then there are the numerous African governments who,
unsurprisingly, welcome China’s presence.148 They appreciate
142. See, e.g., Graham-Harrison, supra note 126 (“African and Chinese business
men and academics say Beijing is filling a yawning need for key infrastructure,
and Chinese firms are also shaking up moribund markets where Western
companies were doing little to develop local economies.”).
143. See China’s African Policy, supra note 135 (suggesting further that the
political atmosphere among African states is stable as a whole because of the
efforts of the Organization of African Unity, African Union, and individual
countries and because African countries’ development is tailored to their national
conditions).
144. See id. (noting that China supports African nations’ growth by aiding in the
areas of trade, investment, agriculture and infrastructure development, tourism,
debt reduction, and other forms of economic assistance).
145. See Klare & Volman, supra note 68, at 622 (noting the similarity in the
approaches of China and the West, both of whom used economic incentives,
diplomacy, and arms deals to acquire oil assets in Africa).
146. Graham-Harrison, supra note 126.
147. Hanson, supra note 71.
148. See Keenan, supra note 50, at 95 (explaining that China is appealing
because many Western states are not providing as much investment and aid as in
prior years and because China’s only condition is that the recipient refuse
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China’s “pure capitalism” engagement, which does not “attempt[] to
enact social or political changes [in Africa] through the pursuit of
wealth.”149 They are of course grateful that China does not require
recipient countries to implement the rigorous anti-corruption
measures upon which the U.S. and other Western governments
frequently insist.150 Some African officials are outspoken in their
defense of the continent’s right to fully engage China, including
South Africa’s High Commissioner in the United Kingdom:
Why can we deal freely with Western countries who once colonized us,
but not with the Chinese who have never done so. It’s an absurdity. All
countries are making a beeline for China. If it is good enough for
Germany then why not for Africa? It is patronizing to suggest that Africa
cannot discern what is in its own best interest.151

In the end, African governments support China’s investment in the
continent because it makes financial sense to them. As Ethiopia’s
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi bluntly stated in 2010, “[i]t’s in
[China’s] interest to spend tens of billions of dollars in Africa and
it’s in our interest to have access to those tens of billions of
dollars.”152

C. CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND
SLIPPAGE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
Is Chinese investment and engagement in Africa a net positive for
the continent? Are African officials and some academics in the West
justified in criticizing those who lament the potential dangers of
Chinese engagement?

recognition of Taiwan).
149. Id.
150. See Lindsey Hilsum, The Chinese Are Coming, NEW STATESMAN, July 4,
2005, at 18 (noting that China has not signed onto any of the recently drafted anticorruption conventions, making Chinese investment come with fewer procedural
hurdles than Western investment). Sierra Leone’s ambassador to China is quoted
as stating: “We like Chinese investment because we have one meeting, we discuss
what they want to do, and then they just do it . . . . There are no benchmarks and
preconditions, no environmental impact assessment.” Id.
151. Heidi Kingstone, What fuels China’s Africa Policy, SPECTATOR.CO.UK
(Feb. 13, 2008), http://www.spectator.co.uk/print/politics/all/503086/web-exclusi
ve-what-fuels-chinas-africa-policy.thtml.
152. Chinese Investment in Africa Faces Corruption Charges, supra note 137.

2011]

MOMENT OF TRUTH

345

It is clear that China’s involvement in Africa does bring benefits
such as infrastructure development, the expertise of specialized
Chinese firms, and the contribution of Chinese peacekeepers in U.N.
peacekeeping missions.153 But the greatest advantage Chinese
engagement brings Africa is access to foreign currency—large sums
often exchanged in nontransparent natural resource deals.154
Two types of investments by Chinese state-owned or private
enterprises in Africa are of particular interest. One category of
investments involves lines of credit extended to African countries in
exchange for drilling or mining concessions. These lines of credit
may be used for particular development or infrastructure projects, but
consistent with China’s Africa Policy, African governments are
typically free to use the funds as they wish.155 A second category of
investments involves loans (or grants) given to African states in
support of infrastructure or other needed projects, where the loan or
grant is required to be spent in a certain way.156 While China would
not require funds to be spent transparently, as other donors might, it
may require the grantee to use the funds to purchase equipment or
services from specified Chinese enterprises, usually selected and
153. Hanson, supra note 71 (praising the benefits of Chinese-African ties, which
allowed for better quality infrastructure at lower cost, $10 billion in canceled
bilateral debt, medical aid, and Chinese contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
missions).
154. See Jian-Ye Wang, What Drives China’s Growing Role in Africa? 11 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/07/211, 2007) (indicating that the
Chinese Ministry of Commerce totals direct investment to Africa at $6.6 billion for
2000 through 2006, but suggesting that official statistics may not paint the full
picture because “the dividing line between trade and project financing . . . is often
unclear”); cf. Kent Hughes Butts & Brent Bankus, China’s Pursuit of Africa’s
Natural Resources, COLLINS CENTER STUDY, June 2009, at 1, 5, available at
http://www.csl.army.mil/usacsl/publications/CCS1_09_ChinasPursuitofAfricasNat
uralResources.pdf (describing an agreement between China and the Democratic
Republic of Congo’s national mining company, wherein China agreed to develop
mining infrastructure in return for the company agreeing to grant to China
concessions in two copper deposits).
155. Cf. Keenan, supra note 50, at 118 (pointing out that the condition-free
nature of the funds make the loans seem like “political slush funds” as opposed to
investments for financial return).
156. Sharon LaFraniere & John Grobler, China Spreads Aid in Africa, With a
Catch for Recipients, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/09/22/world/africa/22namibia.html (noting how Chinese investments are not
without catches because recipients of Chinese aid must use it to purchase goods
from Chinese companies, many of which are state-owned).
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communicated behind closed doors.157 Competitive bidding is often
discouraged or even disallowed, and the terms of the deals are often
opaque and rarely made public.158
It is important to recognize that Chinese engagements in Africa are
diverse, and certainly not all involve acts of corruption.159 However,
the risk of China’s current engagement philosophy in Africa, as
defined in its Africa Policy, is that the offer of wealth to
unaccountable regimes, unconditioned on good governance, fosters
increased corruption and ultimately impedes development.160 Rentseeking officials161 in Africa take advantage of the lack of
transparency in resource deals with China to personally profit in the
transactions.162 The opaqueness of China’s engagement in Africa
therefore facilitates corruption in states where the rule of law is
already severely inhibited.163 Furthermore, by offering “no questions
asked” cash deals to regimes, China erodes African states’ incentives
157. See id. (reporting that China does not publicize deal terms such as project
costs, loan terms, and repayment conditions); Jonathan Clayton, China tightens
grip on Africa with $4.4bn lifeline for Guinea Junta, THE TIMES (U.K.), Oct. 13,
2009,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6871943.ece
(pointing out that African marketplaces are now filled with plastic sandals,
underwear, tools, motorcycles, and artificial flowers from China). While the
United States often requires recipients of aid to purchase U.S. products and
services with the aid, the process for vendor selection is typically transparent and
the deal comes bundled with the usual anti-corruption checks and conditions on the
recipient government. See Steven Radelet, A Primer on Foreign Aid 7 (Center for
Global Development, Working Paper No. 92, July 2006) (estimating that the
United States historically ties 75% of its aid to conditions).
158. LaFraniere & Grobler, supra note 156.
159. The author recognizes that China’s engagement with Africa involves a
variety of enterprises, both state and private, interacting in numerous different
ways. The author does not wish to paint all Chinese investment in Africa with a
single brush, but rather focus specifically on the opaque engagements by China
that pose the greatest risk to the continent’s development.
160. Cf. Keenan, supra note 50, at 110-15 (explaining that unconditioned wealth
discourages politicians from developing other revenue streams, which can lead to
overconsumption of a resource and a failure to respond to citizens’ concerns).
161. Rent seeking officials in this context are government officials with control
over natural resources who seek to illicitly profit from the “rents” obtained by
leasing access to such resources—typically to foreign countries or enterprises.
162. Cf. infra notes 215-24 and accompanying text (detailing corrupt African
leaders’ past abuse of U.S. aid).
163. See Graham-Harrison, supra note 126 (observing that Western activists and
politicians argue that China is building up corrupt regimes and receiving valuable
natural resources in return).
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to implement a rule of law or combat corruption. Sadly, but
predictably, those rent-seeking officials who stand to personally
profit defend China’s opaque engagement methods.164
In countries where the rule of law is weak and public officials are
not fully accountable to the populace, nontransparent engagement by
the Chinese incentivizes unaccountable leaders to behave in abusive,
self-serving ways.165 Deals that offer cash for access to natural
resources without enforcing good governance or anti-corruption
measures on the recipient regimes negatively impact the economic
and political health of the recipient countries.166 Such unconditioned
wealth perverts the incentives of officials with control over a
country’s natural resources and encourages the over-extraction of
resources to the detriment of future generations.167
This is not to say that no country on earth can extract and trade
abundant natural resources to the benefit of its people. Despite talk of
the resource curse, the problem is not the presence of natural
resources but rather the presence of natural resources in a country
without strong public institutions and accountability for public
officials. Countries with a strong rule of law and strong democratic
institutions are better positioned to manage natural resources.168
Resource wealth is detrimental to economic, political, and social
development in many African states because they are ruled by
unaccountable, autocratic regimes and their rule of law is either weak

164. Cf. Rob Crilly, Chinese Seek Resources, Profits in Africa, USA TODAY,
June 22, 2005, at 4B (quoting a Kenyan government spokesman who said: “You
never hear the Chinese saying that they will not finish a project because the
government has not done enough to tackle corruption. If they are going to build a
road, then it will be built.”).
165. See Keenan, supra note 50, at 90 (arguing that China’s investments can
lead to human rights abuses because they provide leaders with access to financial
resources otherwise denied to them by countries concerned with their abusive
behavior).
166. See id. at 88-90 (explaining that the receipt of “unconditioned wealth”
results in, inter alia, the consumption of resources “too quickly,” the failure to
“respond to the concerns of citizens,” and the centralization of the decision-making
process).
167. Id. at 114.
168. See id. at 111 (noting that evidence shows that resource wealth does not
seem to have a detrimental effect on well-functioning democracies, whereas it has
adverse affects on weaker democracies or delays transitions to democracy for other
countries).
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or non-existent.169 Where unaccountable public officials possess
access to unconditional funds from the natural resource trade, they
no longer rely on domestic taxation to fund the operations of state,
and this undermines the need for institutions or procedures that
would support a sustainable system of revenue generation.170
On the whole, investments by the Chinese government where no
governance conditions are imposed on the recipient states, i.e., no
demand-side anti-corruption accountability, and by Chinese
enterprises that are not required to comply with FCPA-type anticorruption regulations, i.e., no supply-side anti-corruption
accountability, are prone to reduce economic and political welfare in
Africa.171 The fact that Chinese investment in Africa provides an
injection of wealth and infrastructure to the continent is only one part
of the narrative. The combination of vast natural resources,
unaccountable leaders, weak public institutions, and trading partners
willing to ignore these conditions leads to an economic windfall for
African officials—but exploitation for the African people.

D. FIVE CHINESE ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA
An examination of recent Chinese engagements in Africa reveals
several prominent examples of African countries being harmed by
natural resource deals. This harm is the direct result of a weak rule of
law and no enforcement of anti-corruption or governance standards
by either the Chinese or African contracting party.
1. Namibia
In 2007, China gave the Namibian government a large, lowinterest loan to purchase smuggler-deterrent cargo scanners.172
Namibian officials wanted to seek competitive bids for the scanner

169. Cf. Africa’s Year of Elections: The Democracy Bug is Fitfully Catching On,
THE ECONOMIST, July 24, 2010, at 47, 47-48 (contending that the elections in
many African nations are illegitimate because they are fixed in advance or go
unrecognized when an incumbent loses).
170. See Keenan, supra note 50, at 111, 114 (arguing that the presence of
unconditioned wealth undermines a regime’s respect for human rights because
rent-seeking public officials with access to outside wealth are no longer
accountable to the people for votes or taxes).
171. E.g., THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA, supra note 48, at 5.
172. LaFraniere & Grobler, supra note 156.
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purchases, but China refused and required the scanners to be
purchased only from Nuctech, a state-controlled Chinese firm.173 It
was later revealed that Nuctech was run by Hu Haifeng, the son of
Chinese President Hu Jintao.174 Moreover, the firm paid $4.2 million
in kickbacks to Namibian officials to seal the original loan and
scanner purchase deal, and investigators found that the Namibian
government actually overpaid for the scanners.175 Shortly after the
allegations broke, Namibia requested assistance in its investigation,
but China refused to fully cooperate.176 Chinese censors immediately
blocked any mention of the scandal in the Chinese media and on the
Internet.177
2. Democratic Republic of Congo
In 2008, China agreed to give $9 billion in low-interest loans to
develop a joint venture, Sicomines, together with the government
mining company of the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”).178
In exchange for the twenty-five year term loans, China was granted
concessions for “10 million tons of minerals, 6.5 million tons of
refined copper, 200,000 tons of cobalt, and 372 tons of gold.”179 The
deal also included large signing bonuses paid by Chinese enterprises
involved in the project to Gecamines, DRC’s largest state-owned
173. See id. (quoting the permanent secretary of the Namibian Finance Ministry,
who worried about the Chinese insistence that “[w]e tell you from whom you buy
the equipment”).
174. See generally Sebastien Berger & Malcolm Moore, Hu Jiantao’s Son
Linked to African Corruption Probe, TELEGRAPH.CO.UK (July 17, 2009, 5:25 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/5851056/Hu-Jintaos-sonlinked-to-African-corruption-probe.html. Hu Haifeng was president of Nuctech
until 2008 before he was promoted to party secretary of a larger Chinese state
holding company. Id.
175. See LaFraniere & Grobler, supra note 156 (explaining that Namibia’s anticorruption commission found that Nuctech paid the kickbacks to a “front company
set up by a Namibian official, who split the funds with her business partner and
Nuctech’s southern Africa representative, a Chinese citizen”).
176. See id. (indicating that investigators sought Nuctech’s explanation for more
than two months and even traveled to Beijing, but these investigators never
received answers).
177. Sharon LaFraniere & John Grobler, Namibians Say Inquiry on China Will
Expand, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/01/
world/africa/01namibia.html.
178. Chinese Investment in Africa Faces Corruption Charges, supra note 137.
179. Id.
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mining company.180 Shortly after the Chinese paid the loan, $23
million in signing bonuses vanished, presumably into the pockets of
DRC officials.181
3. Zimbabwe
Facing global sanctions and skyrocketing inflation, Zimbabwe’s
oppressive regime led by Robert Mugabe turned to China several
years ago for help.182 Following China’s commitment to provide $5
billion in loans to Zimbabwe in 2009, Zimbabwe’s state-run
newspaper declared, “[w]e salute China for being an all-weather
friend to our country.”183 As part of its “Look East” policy,
Zimbabwe gave Chinese enterprises significant stakes in previously
state-owned firms, many of which involved loans in exchange for
access to natural resources.184 Unable to purchase weapons
elsewhere, Zimbabwe also bought military equipment from China.185
China’s importance to the pariah regime in Harare is even reflected
in the latest push by Zimbabwe’s public universities to develop
“required courses in Chinese history and language.”186

180. Id. (noting the National Assembly of DRC investigated the missing money
paid as bonuses).
181. Id. (indicating that the investigation into the missing signing bonuses
prompted questions about transparency in China’s business deals); see also CongoKinshasa: Kinshasa’s Missing Millions, AFR.-ASIA CONFIDENTIAL (London), Feb.
15, 2010, available at http://www.allafrica.com/stories/printable/2010021
51711.html (indicating that the bonuses were part of a larger $50 million dollar
scheme and suggesting that the investigation into the missing funds will lead to
public scrutiny of the Chinese parties involved).
182. See, e.g., Editorial, Zimbabwe: Look East Policy Pays Off, THE HERALD
(Zimbabwe), July 8, 2009, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/
200907070383.html (praising China for a $950 million line of credit to Zimbabwe
for economic growth and for the promotion of diplomacy).
183. Id.
184. Keenan, supra note 50, at 104; see The “Look East Policy” of Zimbabwe
Now Focuses on China 5 (Policy Briefing Paper, Friedrich-Evert-Stiftung,
November 2004) (suggesting that China is particularly interested in Zimbabwe
because of its abundance of iron, chrome, and platinum).
185. See Keenan, supra note 50, at 104 (indicating that Zimbabwe needed China
because of the existence of a Western arms embargo); cf. The “Look East Policy”
of Zimbabwe Now Focuses on China, supra note 184 at 7-8 (describing a deal
between China and Zimbabwe for fighter jets and other military vehicles as
potentially threatening to regional stability).
186. Keenan, supra note 50, at 104.
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4. Sudan
One of China’s most successful African energy investments is in
Sudan, another pariah state.187 The Chinese provided weapons and
military equipment to Sudan, much of which was used in Darfur.188
China also invested in a consortium drilling for oil in Darfur, and it
was alleged that Chinese companies assisted Sudanese forces in
bulldozing and torching southern Sudanese villages to make way for
an oil pipeline.189 While the West spurned Sudan in response to
massive human rights abuses, and Western companies abandoned
valuable concessions there, China on the other hand actually
increased its activity to compensate for the loss of Western
participation.190 As of 2008, 60% of Sudan’s oil output was exported
to China.191
5. Angola
Oil constitutes over 95% of all Angolan exports,192 and corruption
in Angola’s oil and gas-related ministries is rampant. Between 1997
and 2002, Human Rights Watch estimates that $4.22 billion was
stolen from the public treasury, roughly equivalent to the total
“foreign and domestic social and humanitarian spending in Angola
187. See id. at 100-01 (discussing how China began selling military weapons to
Sudan’s government and maintaining that China’s deals to buy into oil
consortiums in South Sudan and the Darfur region insulated Sudan from sanctions
for human rights abuses).
188. See Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry:
Beijing Supplies Arms Used on Villagers, WASH. POST, Dec 23, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html
(articulating how the Sudanese government utilized Chinese-made military
vehicles and arms in the Second Sudanese Civil War and in the commitment of
genocide during fighting in the Darfur region).
189. See GHAZVINIAN, supra note 29, at 287 (contending that according to
locals, “Chinese people” in bulldozers preceded Sudanese soldiers who burnt huts,
and Chinese troops continue to protect the 900-mile Chinese-built pipeline).
190. See id. at 288 (explaining that China clarified that it will veto any attempt
by the U.N. Security Council to bring sanctions against Sudan for human rights
abuses because of Sudanese sovereignty); Goodman, supra note 188 (noting that
China National Petroleum Corp. owns the largest share (40%) of the consortium
that dominates Sudan’s oil fields).
191. Hanson, supra note 27.
192. ALEX VINES ET AL., THIRST FOR AFRICAN OIL: ASIAN NATIONAL OIL
COMPANIES IN NIGERIA AND ANGOLA 41 (2009), available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14524_r0809_africanoil.pdf.
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over the same period.”193 Years of civil war, fiscal mismanagement,
and an economy dependent on commodity prices left Angola
dependent on the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) for
emergency assistance during periods of low oil prices or other
hardship. When Angola sought IMF assistance in 2007, the IMF
helped but conditioned assistance on democratic elections and other
important governance reforms.194 Ultimately, Angola rejected IMF
assistance in favor of an equal package from China, which offered
aid without transparency and accountability requirements.195 During
this time, Angola also postponed elections and rejected reforms
which were expected to reduce corruption and enhance the country’s
rule of law.196
At least one study concludes that Angola benefitted from Chinese
state investment in the oil and gas industry.197 However, the question
is not whether Angola benefitted, but who in Angola benefitted—
either Angolan ministers and state oil company executives or the
Angolan people. The fact that signature bonuses or discounts from
China were requested198 by an African government as part of tough
negotiations on resource deals does not, in and of itself, mean that
the arrangement benefitted the African state’s people. Deals in states
with a weak rule of law that financially benefit unaccountable leaders
are unlikely to benefit society in the long run.199
193. “TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ANGOLA”, supra note 31, at 1.
194. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2008: EVENTS OF 2007 81
(2008), [hereinafter WORLD REPORT 2008], available at http://www.hrw.org/
wr2k8/pdfs/wr2k8_web.pdf (noting that donors such as the World Bank also
attempted to lend Angola funds contingent on transparency and good governance,
but Angola avoided them by opting to receive unconditional Chinese loans).
195. See John Reed, Angolan Oil Likely to Raise Transparency Issues, FIN.
TIMES (London), Oct. 11, 2005, at 13, 13 (pointing out that China’s Eximbank
loaned $2 billion to Angola to rebuild infrastructure crippled by Angola’s civil
war).
196. See WORLD REPORT 2008, supra note 194, at 81 (citing a failure of foreign
governments and intergovernmental organizations to publicly condemn Angola for
human rights abuses and convince them to set election dates).
197. See VINES ET AL., supra note 192, at 3 (finding that the China-Angola
relationship was “nurtured with care and grew steadily in a pragmatic but
disciplined way to the mutual advantage of both countries”).
198. Id. at 28.
199. See Hanson, supra note 71, (remarking that in 2007, China offered $2
billion in loans to Angola in exchange for future oil production stakes on condition
that the loaned funds be spent on Chinese companies building schools, roads, and
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E. LESSONS FROM CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN AFRICA
The above five incidents share several commonalities. First, they
all involved foreign investment where no conditions of good
governance or transparency were mandated, i.e. a demand-side
failure.200 Second, no anti-corruption standards were imposed on the
Chinese entity involved in the deal, i.e., a supply-side failure.201
Third, the recipient African country is ruled by an undemocratic
regime, with the exception of Namibia, and is plagued by
unaccountable leaders and a poor or non-existent rule of law.202
As stated, this paper does not wish to demonize all Chinese
enterprises in Africa as corrupt and ruthless. Nor does it seek to
glamorize U.S. and other Western engagement in Africa. The actions
of U.S. and other Western companies operating in Africa are not
altogether different from the actions of Chinese enterprises because
many are profit-driven, resource extraction deals that enhance the
resource curse threat and are rarely, if ever, guided by the best
interests of Africans.203 The key distinction is that the United States
and many other Western states impose strict demand-side anticorruption and other governance standards on their state aid to
Africa, and the United States applies strict supply-side anticorruption measures against its private enterprises operating on the
continent.204 When properly enforced, these measures can better align
the incentives of economic actors engaging Africa and reduce the
other infrastructure, but these projects have been halted or seriously delayed).
200. See supra Part III.D (detailing Chinese deals with Namibia, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Angola where the sole condition
was the purchasing of Chinese goods).
201. See supra Part III.D (mentioning that China is not a member of the OECD
and therefore not subject to its policies).
202. See supra Part III.D (describing Namibia, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Angola as countries with corrupt leaders).
203. See Mandy Turner, Scramble for Africa, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), May 2,
2007,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/may/02/society.conservationandend
angeredspecies1/print (describing the race between the United States, France,
Britain, China, and India for Africa’s timber, oil, minerals, diamonds, and natural
gas – a race that includes the construction of U.S. military bases).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 79-104 (explaining that the U.S. FCPA
is a primary supply-side-anti-corruption tool); see also Radelet, supra note 157, at
7 (estimating that the U.S. historically ties 75% of its foreign aid to conditions,
which can add costs and “reduc[e] its impact on recipient countries”).

354

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[26:2

incidence of bribery and other forms of public corruption. China not
only does not impose such standards, but it also explicitly rejects any
intention or desire to impose such standards.205
Some vocal critics of Chinese investment in Africa go overboard
with their rhetoric. One article in a major Western publication, titled
How China Has Created a New Slave Empire in Africa, declared that
“[n]ow a new great power, China, is scrambling for wealth, power
and influence in this sad continent, without a single illusion or
pretence.”206 Such oratory presents an unfair or inaccurate
assessment of China’s activities in Africa. It cannot, however, be
denied that China’s policy of engagement in Africa refuses to shun
ruthless dictators207 and, to some degree, facilitates official
corruption.208 Nor is the fear of Chinese bribery in Africa baseless or
mere speculation; Transparency International rated China next to last
on its 2006 Bribe Payers Index for its measured propensity to pay
bribes.209
China should change its engagement practices in Africa,
jettisoning its policy of non-interference and enforcing good
governance and anti-corruption standards. In the end, however,
China is not the real problem. Official corruption in Africa, nurtured

205. See China’s African Policy, supra note 135 (stating that the only condition
recipients of Chinese aid must agree to is to support the one China principle).
206. Peter Hitchens, How China Has Created a New Slave Empire in Africa,
MAILONLINE (Sept. 28, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
worldnews/article-1063198/PETER-HITCHENS-How-China-created-new-slaveempire-Africa.html.
207. See Keenan, supra note 50, at 103 (arguing that Robert Mugabe could not
have remained in power in Zimbabwe without China’s support because China
supported Mugabe’s party during a “power struggle”).
208. U.S. diplomatic cables recently released by Wikileaks quote a senior U.S.
official in Africa describing China as “a very aggressive and pernicious economic
competitor with no morals.” Wikileaks: U.S. monitors ‘aggressive’ China in
Africa, BBC NEWS (December 9, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa11955516 (quoting the same U.S. official as writing: “The United States will
continue to push democracy and capitalism while Chinese authoritarian capitalism
is politically challenging. The Chinese are dealing with the Mugabe’s and Bashir’s
of the world, which is a contrarian political model.”).
209. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, BRIBE PAYERS INDEX (BPI) 2006: ANALYSIS
REPORT 4 (2006), available at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/
9757/71853/file/BPI_2006_Analysis_Report_270906_FINAL.pdf (giving China
an average score of 4.62 out of a possible 10).
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by the lack of a rule of law, is the crisis.210 The actions of foreign
companies and states operating in Africa can help solve the primary
problem by incentivizing change and reducing corruption from both
the supply- and demand-sides, but lasting reforms in the rule of law
and transparency of leadership must take place before foreign
investment can truly flourish on the continent.211 The international
community must heighten its efforts to bring about these changes.

IV. CORRUPTION IN AFRICA AND LAGGING
DEMAND-SIDE ENFORCEMENT
Over thirty years after passage of the FCPA, corruption in Africa
continues at what seems to be an unabated pace. Corruption still
impacts all aspects of life in sub-Saharan Africa, where daily life is
marred by a broken rule of law.212 In particular, corruption erodes the
health and education sectors of sub-Saharan Africa society, as health
care leakage213 and educator absenteeism214 lowers life spans and sets
up the next generation of Africans for failure. Additionally,
corruption in conjunction with a weak rule of law means many
African countries collect only half of the anticipated taxes, especially
in resource-rich countries with little incentive to develop their tax
bases.215 As an example of the extent of corruption of African
210. See supra Part I.B.1 (describing corruption as the largest hindrance to
Africa’s economic growth).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27 (estimating that Africa loses 25%
of its GDP, or $150 billion, to corruption each year).
212. See THE WORLD BANK, AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 2010:
SILENT AND LETHAL: HOW QUIET CORRUPTION UNDERMINES AFRICA'S
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 14 (2010), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
AFRICAEXT/Resources/english_essay_adi2010.pdf. (finding that in nearly half
the countries in sub-Saharan Africa, “more than 50[%] of firms reported an
expectation of having to make informal payments to ‘get things done’”).
213. See id. at 11 (defining “leakage” in the context of health care as the
difference between resources designated for the health industry and the actual
amounts received by the industry). Health care leakage rates in sub-Saharan Africa
range from 38% in Kenya to 99% in Chad. Id.
214. See id. at 7 (noting that a UNICEF survey found that “more than half the
teachers in Tanzania and Uganda were absent at least one day” per week, while
25% were absent two or more days).
215. AEO finds Africa hit by the crisis but set to rebound, OECD (May 24,
2010),
http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_33731_45248993
_1_1_1_1,00.html (describing how some countries collect few taxes, but other
countries such as Kenya, Morocco, Ghana, and Cape Verde receive nearly three
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government officials, the Ibrahim Foundation, which grants a $5
million prize annually to “a democratically elected former African
Executive Head of State or Government who has served their term in
office within the limits set by the country’s constitution and has left
office,” was unable to identify a single candidate worthy of the
award for the past two years.216 Unfortunately, the future is not
particularly encouraging on the corruption front.
One of the key reasons corruption thrives in sub-Saharan Africa is
that demand-side anti-corruption enforcement is lagging. African
states are not investigating and prosecuting public officials who
demand and accept bribes, and developed countries are not using the
tools at their disposal to help Africa end corruption and structure
their countries for sustainable development.217 Little credible
diplomatic pressure is placed on African states to reform, primarily
due to the political considerations of oil access, which often run
counter to the goal of ending corruption in Africa.218
African dictators use many different aspects of the U.S. financial
system to launder corrupt funds, including through U.S. escrow
times what is expected).
216. Press Release, Mo Ibrahim Found., Mo Ibrahim Foundation Announces
Decision Not to Award 2010 Ibrahim Prize (June 13, 2010), available at
http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/en/media/get/20100614_130610-newsrelease-2010-ibrahim-prize-announcement.pdf (announcing that the Foundation
did not award a prize for the second year in a row). The Foundation attempted to
put a positive spin on the situation by noting that “[t]he standards set for the Prize
winner are high, and the number of potential candidates each year is small.” Id. In
reality the standards are quite simple; they are only made difficult by the fact that
Africa is a continent chock-full of dictators and authoritarian regimes. See
generally Africa’s Year of Elections: The Democracy Bug is Fitfully Catching On,
supra note 169, at 47 (finding that while a handful of African states recently held
or are about to hold elections, many of these elections are illegitimate because they
are “fixed”).
217. See, e.g., South Africa Seen Not Doing Enough to Combat Bribery, INDEPTH NEWS, July 22, 2010, available at http://www.australia.to/2010/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4045:south-africa-seen-notdoing-enough-to-combat-bribery&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=201 (summarizing
an OECD report finding no prosecutions for bribery in South Africa and
recommending that South Africa implement special investigators and prosecutors
to combat bribery).
218. See supra Part I.B.3 (explaining that market forces behind the “curse of
resources” reduce incentives for developed nations to take stands against
corruption and shift focus to a particular industry, such as oil, which causes the
extinction of other domestic industries).
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agents, energy considerations, and even universities.219 The ability to
launder money stolen from African state coffers is a critical
component of any tyrant’s plan for self-enrichment; without it, seized
funds are difficult to use outside of the dictator’s home country. In
February 2010, the U.S. Congress highlighted several particularly
egregious instances where unaccountable African leaders of oil
producing states freely used the U.S. financial system to launder
funds stolen from the African people.220 These instances included the
secretive transfer of millions of dollars into U.S. bank accounts by
Gabon’s President to purchase military equipment and to finance the
lavish lifestyle of his daughter,221 the wiring of $50 million by
Nigeria’s former Vice President into the United States to pay for
suspect consulting services,222 and a supplier of arms to the Angolan
government who used thirty Bank of America accounts in the United
States to launder Angolan government funds and transfer those funds
to accounts around the globe.223 In each of these instances, U.S. laws
and mechanisms designed to prevent corrupt officials from
exploiting the U.S. financial system and reaping the benefits of their
ill-gotten gains failed miserably.
Family and friends of Equatorial Guinea’s dictator are successful
in finding support in the United States for their corrupt rule.
219. See STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOV'T. AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., KEEPING FOREIGN
CORRUPTION OUT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUR CASE HISTORIES 1-6 (Comm.
Print 2010) [hereinafter SUBCOMM. REPORT ON FOREIGN CORRUPTION]
(summarizing situations where corrupt government officials of Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, Nigeria, and Angola used U.S. lawyers, realtors, escrow agents, lobbyists,
shell corporations, bank accounts, and a university to launder funds).
220. See id. (describing how the wife of Atiku Abubakar, the former Vice
President in Nigeria, helped her husband launder $40 million into the U.S. through
wire fraud).
221. See generally id. at 108-173 (detailing how Gabon President El Hadj Omar
Bongo Ondimba used a U.S. lobbyist and three banks to launder funds in the U.S.
financial system and purchase U.S.-built armored cars and cargo aircrafts).
222. See generally id. at 174-243 (considering how the U.S.-born wife of
Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar assisted her husband in using U.S. bank
accounts, offshore shell corporations, and an American University to launder funds
from 2000 to 2008).
223. See generally id. at 244-325 (examining how an Angolan arms dealer,
government official, and private bank that caters to “politically exposed persons”
used accounts at Bank of America, Citibank, HSBC, and other small, private U.S.
banks to bring funds into the United States).
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Exploiting gaping holes in U.S. money laundering laws, from 2004
to 2008 the son of Equatorial Guinea’s President, Teodoro Nguema
Obiang, moved $110 million in pilfered state funds to the United
States with the help of U.S. lawyers, bankers, and real estate agents,
which he used to purchase a $30 million Malibu mansion and a $38.5
million Gulfstream jet.224 As early as 1997, U.S. oil companies were
making payments to Equatorial Guinea, half of which were diverted
into Obiang’s private accounts. Many of those accounts were with
Riggs Bank in the United States, which at one point managed as
much as $700 million in funds for Equatorial Guinea’s officials and
family members.225
Equatorial Guinea’s unsavory regime was the beneficiary of
another key failure of the United States to enforce an important
demand-side anti-corruption measure. In 2004, President Bush issued
Presidential Proclamation 7750, denying entry to the United States
foreign officials who engage in serious corruption, and Congress
later passed supporting legislation.226 Nevertheless, Teodoro Obiang
was welcomed with open arms into the United States and given free
access to his Malibu home, private jet, and fleet of luxury cars.227
This access is granted despite the fact that U.S. officials believe
“most if not all” of his wealth is a product of corruption, including
224. See id. at 2 (noting that the scheme “allow[ed] him to use attorney-client,
law office, and shell company accounts as conduits for his funds . . . without
alerting the bank to his use of those accounts . . . [and i]f a bank later uncovered
Mr. Obiang’s use of an account and closed it, the lawyers helped him open
another”)
225. See Kofele-Kale, supra note 25, at 731 (explaining that the funds were
distributed among more than sixty accounts and certificates of deposit instead of
utilizing such funds for health services or education in his home country); see also
MINORITY STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON
GOV’T AFFAIRS, MONEY LAUNDERING AND FOREIGN CORRUPTION: ENFORCEMENT
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PATRIOT ACT, CASE STUDY INVOLVING RIGGS BANK
37-68 (2004) (finding Riggs Bank culpable because of its willful blindness to the
fact that it was handling funds obtained through corruption, especially given the
bank’s longstanding relationship with officials of Equatorial Guinea).
226. See Proclamation No. 7750, 69 Fed. Reg. 2287 (Jan. 12, 2004) (citing the
“the serious negative effects that corruption of public institutions has on the United
States’ efforts to promote security and to strengthen democratic institutions and
free market systems” as reasons for denying entry to corrupt foreign officials).
227. See Ian Urbina, A U.S. Visa, Shouts of Corruption, Barrels of Oil, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2009, at A1 (stating that Teodoro Obiang goes to his $35 million
Malibu estate several times per year and is always allowed into the United States).
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proceeds from a tax which Obiang, Equatorial Guinea’s Forest and
Agriculture Minister, imposed on timber and demanded be paid to
him personally.228 While Obiang finds a welcome mat at the U.S.’s
door, the United States publicly shuns Zimbabwean strong man
Robert Mugabe. A former U.S. ambassador to Equatorial Guinea
summed up the disconnect by stating that “if Zimbabwe had
Equatorial Guinea’s oil, Zimbabwean officials wouldn’t still be
blocked from the U.S.”229
While the Chinese government does not even attempt to use
demand-side mechanisms to reform corrupt governments in subSaharan Africa, such efforts by the United States and other Western
countries remain weak, and political considerations prevent them
from effectively reducing the incidence of corruption in Africa. In
the absence of strong public institutions and a firm rule of law, both
supply-side regulations, e.g., the FCPA, and demand-side conditions,
e.g., best practices governance standards, must be placed on
economic actors and regimes to rein in incentives to abuse and
exploit.

V. THE FUTURE OF CORRUPTION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: TWO
SCENARIOS
Supply-side anti-corruption efforts in Africa are at a critical
juncture, and the near future presents two likely scenarios. In
Scenario 1, enforcement of anti-corruption standards continues in the
United States, and other key countries, including China, Russia, and
228. See id. (quoting former U.S. ambassador to Equatorial Guinea, John
Bennett, who argues that the U.S. allows Obiang into the country in spite of federal
law because of U.S. dependence on Equatoguinean oil reserves); see also
Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Division on Request for
Assistance in the Investigation of Teodoro Nguema Obiang and his associates to
the Central Authority of France (Sept. 4, 2007), available at
http://documents.nytimes.com/investigating-teodoro-nguema-obiang/ (noting that
Obiang is involved in “the illicit transfer and laundering of assets believed to be
derived from extortion, bribery and/or the misappropriation, theft, or
embezzlement of public funds” from oil companies operating in Equatorial
Guinea).
229. Urbina, supra note 227; cf. Proclamation 7750, supra note 226, §§ 1(a)-(c)
(limiting application to officials whose corruption has “serious adverse effects on
the national interests of the United States”).
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India, join in the fight by passing and enforcing similar tough
standards on their entities operating in Africa. This enforcement
results in reforms within the political and business cultures of key
developing countries, and the supply of bribes by foreign entities in
Africa evaporates. The incidence of corruption drops, paving the way
for governance reforms in African states where accountability is
embraced and where a rule of law is implemented.
Scenario 2 offers a much less pleasant vision. The United States
and several other countries continue the anti-corruption crusade
primarily alone, and enterprises from China and other countries free
from supply-side enforcement gain significant ground in sub-Saharan
Africa. Oil and gas companies with connections to the United States,
and thus subject to the FCPA, lobby Congress for a reprieve amidst
the search for energy independence and rising energy costs, and the
United States tires of fighting the battle alone. The tide of
enforcement wanes and progress made to date is lost.
Of the two scenarios, a Scenario 1 outcome would result in the
greatest utility for both the people of sub-Saharan Africa and the
global economy. However, reforms must be implemented to increase
the likelihood that this scenario comes to fruition instead of Scenario
2. It is to be noted that as unpleasant as Scenario 2 may be, it is not
unlikely given the current enforcement trajectory of FCPA cases
focusing on U.S. oil operators and related suppliers and
subcontractors working in Africa.230 This could present a future
problem because Africa is an increasingly important source of U.S.
oil; in 2005 18.7% of oil imported into the U.S. came from Africa.231
A loss of U.S. operator competitiveness in Africa due to heightened
anti-corruption enforcement, including the costs of compliance
programs and concessions lost to competitors not subject to FCPA230. See supra notes 93-101 and accompanying text (discussing recent FCPA
settlements involving South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Egypt).
231. See Rob Crilly, Oil From Africa Comes with Political Instability, USA
TODAY, May 1, 2006, at 7B (comparing African imports to Middle Eastern imports
and reporting that from 2000 to 2005, the share of U.S. imports from the Middle
East fell from 22% to 17% of the U.S. total); see also AFR. OIL POLICY INITIATIVE
GRP., supra note 64, at 4 (projecting a major increase in U.S. oil imports from
Africa by the year 2020, which may necessitate multi-layered agreements with the
Gulf of Guinea region); Wheat, supra note 26 (emphasizing U.S. dependence on
African oil and noting that by 2015, the U.S. is projected to obtain over 25% of its
oil through offshore drilling West Africa).
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like laws, could pressure the U.S. government to jettison its anticorruption crusade.232

VI. RECOVERY IN AFRICA: WHAT IS NEEDED TO
SUCCEED IN THE BATTLE AGAINST
CORRUPTION
The scale of sub-Saharan Africa’s emergence from the global
recession of 2008-2009 will depend on two critical elements: the
even global enforcement of supply-side anti-corruption standards on
foreign companies operating in Africa, and a renewed commitment
to demand-side anti-corruption efforts, including a sustained effort
by governments that engage Africa to utilize anti-corruption tools
even when it is not politically expedient.

A. CONSISTENT, GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPLY-SIDE ANTICORRUPTION STANDARDS
The international community must push for global universal
enforcement of FCPA supply-side anti-corruption principles. This
concept includes increased enforcement within OECD countries that
already passed and, in principle, agreed to enforce supply-side anticorruption laws, as well as passage and enforcement of FCPA-type
legislation by non-OECD states.233 In particular, the capital-rich
countries of China, Russia, and India, none of which are parties to
the OECD convention, must be pressured to impose and enforce anticorruption standards on their businesses in Africa.234 The activities of
232. See Alex Free, Multinational Oil, the US and Nigeria: A Crude Contract,
PAMBAZUKA (May 13, 2010), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/
64412 (arguing that the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill heightened pressure to cease
offshore drilling in the United States and source more oil from Africa).
233. See generally Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 84, art. 3
(requiring all states parties to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials and
impose sanctions on culpable individuals, such as the “deprivation of liberty”). For
a timeline of each member country’s implementing legislation, see David C.
Weiss, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of Profits,
and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality,
Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 488-89 n.101, 489-90 n.
102, 490-91 n.103 (2009).
234. See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding AntiBribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 351, 401 (2010) (noting that out of the four largest “BRIC” emerging markets
countries—Brazil, Russia, India and China—only Brazil has adopted the OECD
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these states today, particularly in the energy and mining industries,
unimpeded by the rigorous anti-corruption standards faced by their
competitors, are hampering the fight against corruption in Africa. For
example, while the United States and some OECD counterparts take
a hard line against official corruption in oil and gas exporters like
Angola,235 China in particular is cultivating “‘pragmatic’
partnership[s]” with the opaque Angolan regime “with no political
preconditions.”236
The U.S. government should also broaden its enforcement
practices to cover a larger array of industries and players within
industries. One current trend in prosecutions under the FCPA
involves focusing on individual players within larger industries
identified as making improper payments in Africa, with the goal of
deterring corrupt behavior across the industry.237 While these highprofile prosecutions may deter such behavior, they subject the target
entities to huge fines and loss of business while non-prosecuted
industry players, who may be more culpable, are rewarded with

convention).
235. See “TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ANGOLA”, supra note 31, at
25 (applauding the United States as one of the first to advocate transparency and to
“point out the widespread corruption, mismanagement, and lack of transparency in
the oil and diamond sectors”).
236. See id. at 23-24 (quoting Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos and
arguing that Chinese influences “have served as a counterweight to Western
pressure for reform”).
237. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Officer and Director of Global
Engineering and Construction Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery and
Kickback Charges (Sep. 3, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/
September/08-crm-772.html (announcing the guilty plea of a former officer and
director of a Houston-based global engineering, construction, and services
company for participation in a scheme to bribe Nigerian government officials);
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Former Willbros International Consultant Pleads
Guilty to $6 million Foreign Bribery Scheme (Nov. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/November/09-crm-1220.html (announcing the
guilty plea of a consultant for Willbros International, Inc. for conspiring to pay
more than $6 million in bribes to Nigerian government officials); Press Release,
Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-two Executives and Employees of Military and Law
Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/January/10-crm-048.html
(announcing that “twenty-two executives and employees of companies in the
military and law enforcement products industry have been indicted for engaging in
schemes to bribe” African government officials).
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additional customers and contracts.238
At the same time, the U.S government should continue to focus on
foreign and multinational corporations within its jurisdictional reach
to help level the playing field in favor of the United States and
European countries and against states without FCPA-type legislation.
While FCPA affords the U.S. government limited jurisdiction over
foreign companies, the United States possesses an array of tools for
reaching non-U.S. entities, including the use of U.S. mails or “acts in
furtherance” of corruption committed on U.S. soil, improprieties
committed as an agent of a U.S. entity or aiding and abetting a U.S.
entity, investigations of the U.S. customers of purely foreign
enterprises, and use of the federal conspiracy statute.239

B. RAMPING UP DEMAND-SIDE EFFORTS AND RENEWED
GOVERNMENT COMMITMENTS IN THE CORRUPTION FIGHT
Supply-side efforts alone cannot salve the lesions of corruption in
sub-Saharan Africa. While enforcing anti-corruption values on the
private sector, governments around the world must also make the
hard choice to condemn corrupt officials even when not politically
238. See Jeffrey Cramer, Commentary: The FCPA Game Has Changed: Trends
in Enforcement, MAIN JUSTICE (Apr. 23, 2010), http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/
04/23/commentary-the-fcpa-game-has-changed-trends-in-enforcement (noting that
the DOJ has greatly increased the number of FCPA cases it prosecutes and
discussing how FCPA investigations typically take several years from start to
finish, beginning with a description of the arrest of twenty-two business executives
following a two-and-a-half year undercover operation). Target companies suffer
from the loss of investors and customers for an extended period due to the
uncertainty of the investigation’s outcome, and unprosecuted industry competitors
therefore get a lengthy period of time to gain market share and take advantage of
the target company’s misfortune. Id.
239. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006) (permitting the U.S. government to
assert jurisdiction over non-U.S. companies and individuals whose conduct occurs
“in the territory of the United States”); DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL § 1018 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-3 as “conferring jurisdiction whenever a foreign company or national causes
an act to be done within the territory of the United States by any person acting as
that company’s or national’s agent”). The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions apply to
U.S. persons, domestic concerns, and foreign persons who commit an act in
furtherance of a violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(f)(1). By using these additional
FCPA investigative and prosecutorial tools, the DOJ is potentially able to impact
the operations of purely foreign companies with a subsidiary in the United States,
customers in the United States, or operations that otherwise touch upon the United
States.
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expedient and pressure African states to crack down on corrupt
officials.240
Three actions to fight corruption stand as particularly important
for the United States and other governments with respect to subSaharan Africa. First, governments must enforce greater controls on
corrupt officials’ use of the global financial system to launder funds
stolen from public coffers or spend these funds on lavish lifestyles.241
It is deplorable that, for example, one of the most depraved regimes
on earth could obtain free rein to launder and spend money in the
United States that should be used to provide basic health care for the
desperately poor people of Equatorial Guinea.242 Specifically,
prevention and detection controls relating to known corrupt officials
and their families should be strengthened, allowing banks and other
players in the global financial system to detect and prevent attempts
to launder the proceeds of corruption.243 These controls may include
new requirements on money transfers with shell corporations,
broader use of existing databases of corrupt officials and their
associates, and extension of existing Patriot Act money laundering
requirements to intermediaries like real estate agents. The U.S.
government should also fully enforce Proclamation 7750 and deny
U.S. visas to these officials, even where it could result in a row over
oil supplies and a slight uptick in the price of gasoline in the United
240. See, e.g., Christopher M. Matthews, Nigeria Investigating Bribes Stemming
from Daimler FCPA Case, MAIN JUSTICE (June 7, 2010, 4:23 PM),
http://www.mainjustice.com/justanti-corruption/2010/06/07/Nigeria-investigatingbribes-stemming-from-daimler-fcpa-case/print/ (describing Nigeria’s Economic
and Financial Crimes Commission announcement of its investigation of Nigerian
officials allegedly involved in corruption with German car maker Daimler). The
Nigerian government specifically announced the investigation in response to
Daimler’s $185 million FCPA settlement with the U.S. DOJ that included charges
of $15 million in bribes paid to Nigerian officials. Id.
241. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. REPORT ON FOREIGN CORRUPTION, supra note 219, at
6 (recommending passage of a law that requires banks to screen clients against the
Politically Exposed Persons database and obtain other background information on
them).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 219-24 (explaining that the son of
Equatorial Guinea’s president moved over $100 million from Equatorial Guinea to
the United States to buy a Malibu mansion, Gulfstream jet, and to lead a lavish
lifestyle).
243. See SUBCOMM. REPORT ON FOREIGN CORRUPTION, supra note 219, at 6
(advocating for a law implementing World Bank recommendations on bank
controls relating to Politically Exposed Persons).
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States.244
Second, governments must apply consistent pressure, coupled with
the credible threat of consequences, on sub-Saharan African
countries to increase the accountability of their public officials and
implement a rule of law.245 U.S. policy is to reward good governance
in African states with greater trade, but this policy is not consistently
practiced, particularly when the importation of oil is involved.246
Governments and multinational public institutions, including the
World Bank and IMF, should take advantage of the economic
downturn to redouble efforts to influence particularly corrupt African
states and incentivize reform.247 Such efforts might include loans or
aid contingent on implementation of an externally-managed national
oil pension fund into which oil revenues must be invested for future
generations.248 Governments could also require their oil and gas
companies operating in Africa to publicly report an accounting of
monies paid to oil exporting states, while economic and diplomatic
pressure could be used to require those same oil exporting states to
disclose all funds received from oil operators. Authentic
commitments by African oil exporting states to financial and
244. See note 226 and accompanying text.
245. Cf. Martyn Drakard, Corruption and Bribery as a Way of Life in Africa,
THE CUTTING EDGE (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/
index.php?article=11736 (reporting a May 2008 study finding that 90% of Burundi
entrepreneurs understand that bribes are a standard part of business practice,
especially when taxes are involved).
246. See James S. Guseh & Emmanuel O. Oritsejafor, The African Growth and
Opportunity Act and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, 10 WHITEHEAD J.
DIPL. & INT’L REL. 123, 131 (2009) (noting one of the three objectives of the U.S.
African Growth and Opportunity Act is to “[s]trengthen relationships with those
governments, institutions and civil society organizations committed to deepening
democracy, accountability and reducing poverty in Africa”).
247. See “TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN ANGOLA”, supra note 31, at
3 (reporting that Angola agreed to full audits of Sonangol, the state-owned oil
company, and increased transparency in government expenditures in exchange for
$1.4 billion in emergency funds from the IMF). While these are positive steps,
Angola made similar commitments in the past only to renege when the economic
good times rolled once again. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text
(explaining that Angola rejected IMF assistance previously, opting to receive funds
from China encumbered by far fewer conditions).
248. See, e.g., ‘The Resource Curse’, supra note 46, at 2 (explaining that
Norway, the world’s third largest exporter of oil, invests much of its oil revenue in
a national pension fund nicknamed “the future generations fund,” which will reach
an estimated value of $900 billion in the next decade).
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accounting transparency in state oil revenues and expenditures would
discourage rampant pilfering of public funds and increase revenues
available to construct roads, schools, and hospitals.249
Third, Western countries should curb their protectionist tendencies
and allow African states to sell products on world markets. European
policies that prevent African farmers from exporting certain crops to
the European Union and other similar protectionist measures are
“costly” for the developed countries who implement them but
“potentially deadly” for African states with small domestic
markets.250 Without the ability to develop local industries like
agriculture and textiles for export, sub-Saharan African states will
continue to rely on the extraction and export of natural resources for
much needed revenue.251 As discussed above, dependence on
exportation of natural resources subjects African states to the risk of
an inflated currency, which harms local industries.252 Diversification
is critical to sub-Saharan Africa’s development, and the international
community should drop protectionist barriers and allow African
products other than petroleum to compete on global markets.

CONCLUSION
Over three decades after its passage, the FCPA is significantly
influencing the behavior of companies subject to its jurisdiction.
Millions of dollars are being spent by these companies on
compliance programs, third party due diligence, and training
programs to ensure acts of bribery are prevented, detected, and
promptly remediated.253 The FCPA, in particular the ramp-up in
249. See generally Extractive Indust. Transparency Initiative, EITI Fact Sheet
(Nov. 25, 2010), available at http://eiti.org/files/2010-11-25%20EITI%20
Fact%20Sheet.pdf (describing EITI, a voluntary initiative designed to develop
standardized revenue reporting requirements for companies and governments
involved in the trade of natural resources).
250. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Africa’s Capitalist Revolution: Preserving Growth
in a Time of Crisis, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 128 (2009) (noting the “absurdity of
developed-world governments that give with one hand by promoting economic
development and take with the other by practicing protectionism”).
251. Guseh & Oritsejafor, supra note 246, at 137 (noting that in 2007 “80[%] of
U.S. imports under the [African Growth and Opportunity Act] were petroleum
products”).
252. See supra Part I.B.3 (explaining the curse of resources).
253. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, UNITED STATES SENT’G
COMMISSION (2010), § 8B2.1, available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/2010guid/8b2_1.htm
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enforcement over the past decade, considerably increased the
practice of anti-corruption law as companies seek valuable counsel
on how to avoid and respond to acts of corruption within their
ranks.254 A shift in mentality is underway for U.S. companies,
companies with operations in the United States, and companies who
do business on behalf of U.S. companies operating in Africa or in
other higher-risk developing jurisdictions. This shift towards a focus
on anti-corruption compliance and anti-bribery measures, while not
complete, is palpable and shows little sign of abating. While there
are certainly companies yet to fully embrace the costs and
commitment associated with robust FCPA compliance, the risks of
staying on the sidelines are growing, and many companies are
responding accordingly, albeit sometimes grudgingly.255
Despite this clear trend, attaining the ultimate goal of the FCPA to
lower the incidence of official bribery and corruption in Africa and
beyond seems no closer than it was when the Act was passed in
1977.256 Bribery of officials in Africa continues, and it is not clear
what the FCPA’s impact is on the incidence of official bribery in
Africa. Official corruption remains high in Africa, despite the fact
that many companies subject to the FCPA instituted compliance
programs and demonstrated a commitment to eradicating official
bribery within their operations.
These same companies however are growing ever more concerned
about the numerous other companies operating in Africa that are
unencumbered by the anti-bribery strictures weighing upon U.S.
(outlining what the U.S. government considers essential elements of an effective
compliance and ethics program, including due diligence, training, and
remediation).
254. See Cramer, supra note 238 (noting that the DOJ brought over sixty FCPA
cases from 2005 to mid 2010, which is more than the total between 1977 and
2005).
255. See, e.g., Ted Acosta & Eileen Erdos, Does Your Overseas R&D
Organization Comply with the US FCPA?, APPLIED CLINICAL TRIALS ONLINE
(Sep. 29, 2010), http://appliedclinicaltrialsonline.findpharma.com/applied clinical
trials/Online+Extras/Does-Your-Overseas-RampD-Organization-Comply-With-/Ar
ticleStandard/Article/detail/689139?contextCategoryId=47497 (warning pharmaceutical and medical device companies not to take an “out of sight, out of mind”
approach to the FCPA just because most clinical trials take place outside the
United States).
256. See supra Part IV (discussing the lack of demand-side enforcement in
Africa).
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entities and foreign companies with a sufficient jurisdictional
connection to the United States.257 They are growing more vocal
about their worries that companies not subject to FCPA-type
regulations are gaining a significant competitive advantage in Africa.
The rapidly-growing footprint of Chinese companies on the continent
provides some measure of support for those expressing these
concerns.258 At the same time, enforcement against those public
officials in Africa who demand bribes is lacking significantly.
Prosecutions by African states of their own officials who engage in
bribery are inadequate.259 Western countries are, on the whole, failing
to use their full arsenal of weapons to attack the demand-side of
bribery, allowing these efforts to play second fiddle to politics,
energy independence, and national security considerations.
It is important both for the development of the continent and for
the reassurance of companies seeking a place to invest that all
companies competing in African markets play by the same rules.
This concept is not simply an appeal to abstract notions of justice and
fair play, though one could make a compelling argument on those
grounds alone. Without consistency in the application and
enforcement of anti-corruption principles against companies
operating in Africa, the lofty goals of the FCPA and other similar
initiatives are doomed to fail.260 Progress made over the past thirty
years of enforcement with respect to companies from some OECD
countries will be lost when corrupt officials can simply shift their
illicit transactions to other players ready and willing to “pay to play.”
In the same way, governments outside of Africa must make the
often difficult decisions to consistently apply demand-side anticorruption pressures on governments in Africa to increase the
consequences for those public officials who demand and accept
bribes. Failure to put pressure on such officials simply allows them
to seek a supplier of bribes not bound by anti-corruption laws. In the
257. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (explaining jurisdiction under
the FCPA for non-U.S. entities).
258. See supra Part III.A (discussing the rise in Chinese investment in Africa in
the last decade).
259. E.g., South Africa Seen Not Doing Enough to Combat Bribery, supra note
217.
260. See supra Part IV (analyzing the difficulty in anti-corruption efforts and
consistent application of enforcement materials).
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end, uneven supply- and demand-side enforcement of anti-corruption
measures in Africa not only rewards those who fail to play by the
same rules. It also ensures that the very objectives sought by those
important enforcement efforts, i.e., a significant decrease in official
corruption in Africa and sustained development on the continent, will
remain unattained.

